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The lunplications of Transiticnrr1 Theo:ry 
for Stare Decisis 
JILL E. FISCH* 
I. INTRODUCTiON 
Courts and commentators have long had difficulty vvith the doctrine of 
stare decisis. The first troubling issue is identifying the source of the 
doctrine. Although a few scholars have argued that the obligation to 
adhere to precedent is of constitutional origin, 1 the vast majority of 
judges and commentators consider the doctrine merely prudential.c It is 
somewhat incongruous, however, to consider a pruclenti:li di!C!rine as 
imr,Josim: a binding obligation.' Whv do courts ever ;Jclh .::re tc dec isions 
'---' L.- ~ J 
Professor and Director, Center for Corporate. Securities ~md F in~cnci:.tl Law. 
Fordham Lt\V School. 
l. See. e.g .. Lawrence C. MarshalL "Lei Congress 01' it" 1'/; c Cusc un 
Ahsnlulc Rule n/Sliiiu/nrr Slim' Decisis. 88 MICH. L. Rtv. 177. 21 <' -lll (I (:u·guing 
that 'Ll!Jpon for rule of absolute .'tatutory stare c!ecisic; can be i·,, und i:1 constitutional 
Jelt:g~ltion of legislative power to Congress;; Henry P. fvlonaghan. Swre Decisis un{/ 
Constiilltionul Adjudicotion. 88 COLLJvl. L. REV. 723. 7.54 ( 19S8) lsugge,ting that stare 
decisis may be a constitutional imperative compelled by the structure and natun: of 
/\:ti ck lll , amlthe role of the courts that it neates); Note. Consliii!tionul Sture Decisis. 
l 03 HMcV. L. REv. 1344 ( 1990) (reasoning that a constitutiomd rcquirenwnt ui' stare 
c:C.:c' '.i-c may be based upun the formal con stiwtional amendment procc:;s pn1\ idcd by 
i\rtic!e \1 ) . 
. )'fe. e.g .. Payne 'v' . ~rcnn~~ssec, 501 U.S. 808. S28 ( 1901) (·'Sl~t rc ~ - 1 ~.>..:i:-:i:~ i ~; Jl\")t 
~lll il1 •.? .\1J r ai_J JC l ... 'Ol1ll11alld: rather, it ·js a princlpJC Of ~ lncl l! O t ( t n ~ ·..:·· f_· h~! !li,_·~t] for iTiLtl:.t 
u i' adherence lu the latest decision. "J !citation omitted): m v. fe i1t~t1. 52 ! U.S. 
:2 0.\. ~'-15 ( 19')7) !stare decisis rerlects "a poiicy judgm.:nt th~l t 'in n~ o,; :_ J",::.lc rs it is m:.m.: 
llllporUntthat the ~lpplictblc rule o!' Jaw be sett lccJthan thal il be ~e1lkd ; iClLtl!Oll 
(/!"J1i ttcd): hut see Ivlichael SLo kc~~ P~t u!sc::. (_ 'op toin )u!l!CS T. J<irl( { nd rfu: r·n .: of 
c ·{)flS{ifltTit)f/({/ !JlT I! rpretutirnl: Sr!ll!C ;\ftJ(/esr ril e T/:iJ·r/ (~'cl ! !ti!·\·, 
59 ,'\LH. L. REV. 671. 680 ( 19\J)) (clain1ing 1_h ~ tl :-: l~Fe dcci:-;is i.-.; t! nc c) J1 <litu l_; u n ~ :l ': . 
·'· Commentalms ha\·e ic!entificcl a variety C'i' policy rc:Js::b i·u:- \!1c doL·t rin,~. 
which will nol be rqv:ated here. SeC'. C.i! .. .lonath~m iVLtcey. Jh,, hrt', nu l C\icmui 
with which they disagree? This raises a fundamental logical flaw in the 
doctrine. 
This leads naturally to the second problem-the ambiguous scope of 
stare decisis doctrine . Courts have formulated a variety of legal tests that 
are not readily reconciled. From a policy perspective, it is difficult to 
identify the key factors or to determine how they should be weighed.~ 
Indeed, it is arguably a misnomer to describe stare decisis as a legal 
doctrine as wel l as oerhaos misleading to describe orecedents in terms of 
1 1 "-' L 
obligation. 1n reality, as Michael Paulsen has observed, '·precedents are 
sometimes binding and sometimes not.''' 
The resulting uncertainty of application h<.1s caused some commentators 
to argue that the doctrine is politi cally charged and subject to easy 
manipulation." Courts are never truly bound by precedent, the argument 
goes . As a re :~. ult, when courts claim to rely on :-;t<.i.re decisi s. they are 
being disingenuous. using the doctrine to mask the true basis of their 
decision. That such evas ion is possible. because of the tlexible scope of 
the doctrine, is troubli ng. More troubling is the normative premise that stare 
decisis allovvs or requires courts to apply etToneous legal rule s. This 
creates a conflict between stare decisis and other core values of the legal 
system.' On the other hand, the rule of precedent is generally understood as 
Cos1.1 und Benefi r; of"Srure Decisis. 65 CH!-K~:NT L. REv. 93 ( 1989) (icl elllifyin g benefits 
of stare decisis from an econo mi c perspective): Thomas R. Le:; . Srure Decisis in 
Econo111ic Pcrspt'clin·: An Econo111ic Anoil·sis ol tlw Suere!IIC Cuurr "s Doctrine of" 
Prect'denr. 78 N.C. L. REV . 643. 648 (2000) (defendi ng stare decisis in te rms or ih cost-
_,, tYing functi ons). 
4-. The multiple opini ons in P/unned Purenrlwod \'. Cu.1n. 505 U.S. 833 ( 1992), 
~·or example. dcnHJnstratc three different conceptions or the scope of stare dec is is 
Joctrine. The plu;·ality arg ued that princ iples o f stare dec is is precluded overruling Roe\'. 
\Vude. 410 U.S. I i3 (1973). Set' 505 U. S. at 853 (plurality opinion) . Justice Biackmun 
argued that the plu rality gave too litt le weight to the precedenti~11 value of f? oe, stating 
that stare dec isi s requireJ the Court to '~trike down more of the Pennsylvania st<ltute. hi. 
at 934 (Blackmun. J.. concurring in part and disscllling in part). justice Rehnquisr too 
found !'au lt with the plurality's use nf stare decis is but reaso ned that it had given Roe too 
much. r~tther than too little defe rence. !d. at 944 (Rehnqui-;t. L dis:;•:nting:). 
'i [\;] ichetel Stu k,:s Paulsen. Th e MosT Dungcrous Umnch: E\ccuti1·c Pul!"fi" ro Sor 
Wlwr !lie L nl" Is. 83 GEO. L..!. 217,295 (1994 ). 
6. Sec. !'.,:; .. John Wallace, Commen t. Sru re Decisis und tin' Rfhli(jllisl Co urr: Tl1 e 
Cu!/i.1ion oj .'\cril·i \111. Po ssi1 'i.1111 wul Pulirics in Cuse\". -+2 BLI-'1-'. L Rr v. 137. 250 ( 1994) 
[arguing that "[t ihe jo int opinion's use o!' ;:tare decisis 111 Cosn was oven!y pol iticaL 
<llld tl1e: ef:xe. dcp iorahl e"' ): Charles J. Couper. Store /)ecisis: Prc'C t'deur unt! Princi;!/L' in 
Cum riru tiOII(ii .~djudicotion. n COR~ELL L. Rr:v. ,.j.()! . .:102 ( i l):)i)) (descr ibing ;; ta;·c 
dccis i;; <!S cl ""dn<:t ri llC o l' COI!VCi1 iellC1: .. ): Lc :; l i::: A . Lun ncy. rhc Ems ion of iVli rundo : 
S1ure !Jeci.1i .. Ct/iiSCIJIIences. 4S C-\ TH. U. L.. f~EV . 7 27. 7'0 2 i l lJ9l): 1 :.; t<lli ng that sure 
dl~Cis is tC:~c!:-; .. tll j~·::-;u! atr_:~ COUrtS fn) fn Ch~l!"gc:~ u r U~Urping puiiti:.:~d !'tlilCtion<·). 
i . Sc·c. c .,'! .. ( J;ri:--:tophcr J. Peters. l---~oo/ish C~nn .\·i.\'l<!il(Y: ( Jn E'(jllr!liiy. fnf eg ri ty, 
• \ <i 
/'-;-
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a core compone nt of our judicial system. Despite its tlavvs, courts and 
commentators co ntinue to defend some form of stare deci sis . 
This essay argues that existing theories of stare dec isis fa il adequately 
to accoun t for the role of courts in the lawm ~tk ing process. lf \Ve accept, 
as w-e should , that courts make legal rules, at le~lSt to ::;orne ex tent , than 
the doctrine of stare decisis sets one of the p:::ramete rs for the te mporal 
scope of adjud icat ive legal change. Stare decisi s limits the power of a 
court to change a prior judge-made rule. Accorclir:gly. the rules of stare 
decisis determine the permiss ible scope of judicially initiated legal 
change. 
From a policy perspective , the doctrine of sta re decisis the n represents a 
choice among lmvmaking ~llte rnatives. By constraining courts, a strict rule 
of stare decisis requires other imtitutionzd deci~)i onm~lkers to ini tiate legal 
chm:ge through vehic les such as statutory ov.::rridc or cons tit uti onal 
amendment. A more liberal rul e empowers courts to initiate change 
themselves rather than deferring to other lawmaking institutions. More 
generally, by providing the necessary requireme nts fo r judicially initiated 
]eg:a] change. the doctrine determines both ho\v and when kgal chatwe 
~ ~ . ~ ~ 
will occur. As a result, stare deci sis is properly un derstood as a transition 
doctrine.' 
A subsi diary element of th is analysis concerns Ll court's dec ision to 
overrule a precedent. Obviously judge-made lmv is in a constant state 
of tran sitio n. Courts refine, distinguish and modify prior precedents 
constantly, and would continue to do so under the strictest possible 
interpretation of stare decisis . Give n the ability of courts effect ively to 
evade the obli gati on of precedent without affirmatively overruling, 
does it rnake se nse to view stare der.::is is as a fun ctional co nstraint on 
lec:r c\1 " 'f'"lJ1c:rn') l c-' 1 I..- 1( .::::-\..., • 
Thi s Article argues that ~t does. Courts then1selves appear to consider 
stare decisis as L\ binding constraint, at least in son1e cases . Eve n when 
courts overru le a precedent. they typically take pa ins tc justify 
overruling in terms that extend beyond cli~;i.lgreement with the prior 
--------------··----·----· 
und Jusricl! in Srure Decisis . l 05 Yi\LE L.J. 20.\ I. 2()-J. :-; ( 1996) (ck scrib ing ~;ta t -e dec isis 
dS pro moting consis tency at the expense o i".justi ce) . 
~( Leadi11g works on transi tion ~1n:dysis include [Vl ichael Graet z. L<~ul Tmnsiiions : 
Til e C o1e n/f{l'rrouclil ·ir,· in litCI!Il l <' Tar i?l' \·isinn . 12() U. P·\. L. Ri'V . -17 ( J\)77): Lou is 
Kaplnw. i\n Economic Anulni.1 o( Lcgol Fmn.1 iil nns. \1') H ,\R \" . L. REv. )()l) ( 1 9~6) : 
D:miL~i Sh ~!v im. "vi/HU\ RULES C H.\VX: /1.:\ ECO:\U\l!C V·'D Pti L.! T IC.\ L .",'! .. \LY SIS OF 
'T"P ,:\ >-J :·) !TlO\ R ELI EF.\ \ ;!) R.ETR( ).-\CTIV !Tl " (lJ . Chi . Pre:-:;-; ::UOO); s~l L:l L.~:v n·l~ )!'C . C'i!Oll gcs. 
:\;uiciiJ(t!ions unt! Hepurutinns. 99 CuLL:\t. L. R! :V . ~ 657 ( !990). 
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decision. Moreover, courts apparently identify an independent value in 
overruling a precedent, as opposed to merely distinguishing it. Although 
courts can surreptitiously evade the obligations of precedent, they 
consistently confront those obligations directly. The fac t that courts can 
effect legal change without overruling suggests an independent legal 
signifi cance to the decision to overrule. 
Rather than constraining the scope of adjudicative legal change, stare 
decisis may alternatively be understood as specifying the form in vvhich 
that legal change occurs. A court that is precluded from ignoring or 
overruling a precedent is limited to more evolutionary forms of 
lawmaking. Over a series of decisions, a precedent that is never formally 
overruled may lose much of its force through incremental judicial 
clecisionmaking. At the same time, however, incremental legal change 
provides a measure of transition relief that overruling does not. 
Accordingly. the choice between overruling and incremental legal 
change triggers the fundamental issues in transition pol icy. 
Thi s essay develops an analysis of stare dec isis as a transition doctrine. 
Using transition theory , the essay offers an alternative conceptualization 
of sure decisis that refoc uses the inquiry in terms of the nature of judicial 
la'vvmak ing. Although a comprehensive juri sp rudence of adjudicative 
lawmaking is beyond the scope of this essay, transition theory demonstrates 
that key normative assumptions about the lawmaking process inform the 
debate over stare dec isis doctrine. By unmasking those assu mptions, the 
essay sets forth the ground rules for further analysis. At the same time, 
an ex~\min ation of stare decisis offers a new perspective on transition 
analys is and pro vides some tools with which to eval uate the key 
assumptions of modern transition theory. 
The essay proceeds as follows. Part II desc ribes the doct rine of stare 
decisis and explai ns how principles of sta re decisis constra in the 
temporal scope of judicial lawmaking. In particular, Part H demonstrates 
that existing theories of stare decisis focus primarily on a merit-based 
assessment ~)f the old legal rule and identifies the weaknesses of this 
approach. P<m 1li extends traditional stare decisis doctrine by incorporating 
transit ion theory. Jn Part I'/ , the essay identi fi es and evaluates the key 
assumptions of modern trans ition analysis. Fi nally, Part V uses stare 
decisis anal vsis to hi~hli~ht new reasons to reconsider trans ition theor)~'s . ~ ~ 
conclusions about the appropriate manner of legal change . 
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II. TRADITIONAL STARE DECISIS D OCTRINE 
A. The Scope and Significance of Stare Decisis 
cts a ConstrainT on Overruling 
It is helpful to begin the di scussion w ith a formal definition. The 
doctrine of stm·e decisis determines the c ircumstances under which a 
second court w hich considers itself bound by deci sions of the first court 
but disagrees with the legal rule adopted by the first court may or may 
not change that legal rule . Two elements of thi s definition should be 
emphasized. First, stare decisis is significan t only in cases in whi ch the 
second court disagrees with the previously-adopted legal rul e 9 In cases 
in wh ich the second court's analys is of the law wou ld lead it to the same 
legal conclusion, the doctrine of stare decisi s does no work-the 
outcome in the second case is unaffected by whether the court considers 
itself bound. Second, the definition presumes that the second court 
considers itself constrained, to some extent, by the prior decision. To 
the extent that the second court can evade the impact of the legal rule 
other than by overruling it , the court is not changing the rul e for 
purposes of thi s essay. 
T his second factor is important. U nder any rule of stare deci sis, courts 
are only incompletely bound by prior dec isions. The second court has, 
at its disposaL a variety of mechan isms with whi ch to evade the effec t of 
the precedent, including dis tingu ishing the preceden t, characterizing 
components of the old rule as dicta, and so forth. 10 In principle , these 
tool s offer courts expansive power to avoid prior dec isions without 
overruling them. Nonetheless , and despi te the easy availability of 
alternatives, courts do overrule precedents. The persistence of affirmative 
overrulings suggests that overruling a precedent has an independent 
law making value that is irnperfect iy rep licated through the alternat ive 
mechanisms. Although the alternatives may enabl e a court to reach its 
des ired outcome, they do not have the same lawmaking effect. 
Indeed, for purposes of thi s essay , the dist inction bet\veen overruling 
and its alternatives is key. The doctrine of >;tare decisis constrains 
9. See Larry Alexander. Crm.lrruined hr Pren'dcn!. ()_, S. C\1 .. L. REv. I. 4 ( i 939) . 
I 0. See. e.g. , id. at 18 ( cl e~c ribing wh ~tt ~ucccsso r courts can ci o in tcmls or 
narrowing, bmackning, and di st ingui sh ing prior rules) . 5;t>c u/so Earl Ma lc z, Fhc /1/oiun' 
of Freceden t, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367. J84 ( i 9~\0J le.\pl ~tinin g .. th~tt it oft en is dif: icul t tu 
determine wheth er a court is cl e li b,~r~tlc lv zlltnin g pree\ ist in g cloctr in<:· or m:1king cl goocl 
faith effo rt to illlcrprct prior case Lnv .. ). 
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overruling-a distinctive method of legal chan!:Ze-and requires, in those 
~ ~ ~ 
cases in which it applies, one of two alternatives. The first alternative, 
is incremental lawmaking through the tradition al common law 
methodology. 11 In contrast to overruling, traditional adjudicative legal 
change is incremental. Specific deci si ons involve changes of smaller 
magnitude. In addition, the speed and direction of ch ange is more 
ambiguous. A third court, taking at face value the second court's eff011 to 
v ~ 
distinguish the first court 's legal rule , could continue to apply the initial 
rule. Even if the second court ' s decision serves as a signal that the legal 
rule is problematic, the rule' s application need not be immediately and 
universally terminated. Accorclingly, 12 some class of liti gants may 
continue to governed by the old legal rule. Thus distinguishing and other 
incremental forms of legal change afford parties some degree of transition 
relief that is not available when the court explicitly overrules a precedent. 
The second alternative when stare decisis does not permit a court to 
change the lavv by overrulin g is for another lawmaker to effect the change. 
~ ~ ~ 
Congress can enact new le gis lation to overrule decisions involving 
v ~ ~ 
statutory in terpretation or common law ru lemaking. The Ame ndment 
process pro vided by Article V provides a mechanism to overrule 
constitutional decis ions. 1 ; Some constitutional deci sions can also be 
effectively overruled by other means; for example, states can overturn the 
Supreme Court 's decis ion to limit fede ral constitutional rights by 
interpreting their own constitutions to prov ide such rights. 14 There is an 
important distinction, however, between overruling and these lawmaking 
alternatives. When a coun overrules a precedent , the new legal rule is 
appli ed retroacti vely to all pending and future cases .1' Parties that relied 
upon the old rule are not accorded t ran~:ition relief. In contrast, statutory 
changes and constitutional amendments g•:qerally apply prospectively.1" 
II . See Ji ll E. Fisch. RcrmoC!il 'it\· und Legol Clwngc: An Equilihriun1 Aeprooch, 
1!0 HAI\V . L. RL·:V. 1055 . 1107-m~ ( !907; fuistingui .; hing evo luti rllla ry adjudicative legal 
change from legal ,:hc!llge impiemcn!eci through jud icia! overruling). 
12. 5·i'r.: l'viarshall , sup ru note l. at 177 (describ ing ability ofCongre.;~; to overrule 
juclici~ll lw:c,;clents by C!UCting new legi~!alionl : W ill iam N. Lkriclgc. Jr .. Ol·c;-ruling 
Stutwon Preceden Ts. 76 Gt:o. L.J . I :16 1 ( 1988) (ident ifying limit~tti un s rJn legislative 
ahility to ovcrrul~ st::'ttutory pn?t:edcnts and rn"J~1o.-.;in g a it c rn~Hi\· ~ · ·cvnlu t i v~~·· ~tpproach) . 
1:3. See i'·4ote. Sli jJro note l . ~ !l 135 ) -56 (describi ng con:--:titulional ;.u:·;cnci lricn t 
process and identifying t!1e prucc:<; as an :.lh~ ;· ;:~\l i\' e to .iuJicial overruling). 
14. See generally Sy;nposiu;n: 'The F_.ni <:Tgenc!! (~!' Sro!e (~onsriru:ionul Luir. 6.3 
TEX . L. Rr:v. l)) l) ( 1lJ8.5 ) (describing the <k··.<: lopmetlt <>1. :,wte cunstitutiO!J :. tl ,.i,chts tkt t 
exte nd g rc~tlCr pl"t)tection than th<li o liccd hy the fcclc ral conc:titutiunl. 
1.5. Sci' Fi sc h. llljil!l nulc 1 1. ~11 IU6 1-63 :describing rule ,j[· frr\ J retnl~Kti\'i t y !"o r 
judicial lawmaking l. 
16. Alt hough th e~ blanket chara<.:Lc: ri ;;:.JiiOil r·:;lr•:s,: nt s something or ~l\1 l)\"C rst:ltc llklll. 
the hbck kttcr n.tic- i..; lh ~\l ~l~tlul·::; ~tpply pr·>: pe<:tiv:~ ! :,' and judicd r.i::c i siOn': tlpct·~tt<: 
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B. Common Doctrinal Fonn u/otions 
The Supre me Court has arti culated the doctrine of stare dec isis in 
several ways. Although consistently maintaining the operative princ iple 
that subsequent courts canno t ignore authoritative decisions of prior 
courts with which they disagree, the Court has iden tified a variety of 
reasons that justify overruling a precedent. Central to the Court 's approach, 
in most cases, is an evaluation of the qual ity of the old legal rule. T he 
Court has described the nature of the required defect in se veral ways, but 
most commonly has characterized the initial decision as erroneous or 
incorrect. In its most extreme form, the Court 's treatment of stare dec isis 
appears to require little more than a determi nation that the prior rule 
was. to some degree, wrong. 
This app roach is illustrated by the Co urt's decision in Payne \'. 
Ten nessee .17 The Court's justificati on fo r overruling was s imple: it 
conc luded that it s earl ier dec i s i on~-; in Booth \'. Marr!on£r and South 
Carolina \'. Gothers 1 " "were vv rongly decided an d should be , and now 
are , overruled." '" S imilarly. the positi on of the dis~;en t e rs in P!onned 
Parenthood \'. Co.s·e1" has been characterized as applying the standard 
of ''overrule \Vhen wrong."'~ A numbe r of cases have qualifi ed the 
requirement , stating that me re legal ,:; rror is insuffi c ien t ; instead the 
dec is ion must be manifestly or egregi ously incorrect. 2' Nonethe less, in 
it s simples t form, this "wrongne:-.s·· approac h places litt le value on 
precede nt. '.) 
rctroactiv,~ l y . !d. at 1057 . 
17. 501 U.S. 80K ( 1991 J. 
I K. 4K2 U.S . .:+96 ( 1987). 
i 9. --+90 U .S. ~105 ( 1%9). 
20. Przme. 50! U.S. ar :-\."10. 
21 . Cosc\'. 505 U.S. at 9-f4 (Rclmqui:;t. L dissc:nti:1gl ("Vi<~ bel ieve !hat Roc was 
\\-Tongiy d ~~:idecL ~1 nd that it can and :-: ho uld he O\'CrruL:d con ~" istcntly \v ith our trt\clit i un~d 
approac.:h to st~1rc dcc i:..:is in con:"tituli o n~l l cas~~:-\ ... L 
·n KathJc,:n M. Sullivan. The S urrcn1c Courr /99! Terill Fni·;;·urd: The .Justices 
of Rule.\ und Stando rd1 , I 06 HARV . L. REV . 22. 7c+ I I 992 J. 
2:\. Si'e. e.g .. United St~\l.e~. v. G~tudin . .'i i ) U.S. 506 . 521 ( 199j! iconcluciing th~1t 
-.;tare dc::cisis need ll\)[ hl: J'u\Jo\\''.:'d "when Licci :; i OI~ in t.jiX :; ti un h~IS bc•2!i fli'OVccJ :nanil'est Jy 
2:..1- . /-\.s Justice SL·aii a has staled. ail ov: ing ;_~ _i uli~c :t' ignori.:: s t ~ l !- ~: decisis ::; i n1ply by 
ck·nJonstrati ng th al th t..'? ove rruled npin 1un \\ ';.t~~ \··.Tung. \VithcHd llh)l\:' . ,,·ould ('Olllplclt.~ iy 
nullifv the effect or tht.; dnc irinc. Iiu~-d)~trd \-. L.Jnitcd S t~tlc:-: . 51-+ U.S . (/)5. 7 1(1 ( !995 ! 
( Sc:d i a . .l.. concurring in part and cnncuri·i ng 1 il th:; judg nl(_~ nl ). 
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ln addition w operating as a minimal co nstraint on overruling, by 
premising its operation on the characterization of the prior precedent as 
right or wrong, the wrongness approach is based on a strained concepti on 
of judicial decisionmaking. Although it is occasionally possible to 
chnracterize J lower court dec ision as misapplying clearl y applicable 
precedent. n1ost judicial decisionmaki ng is not readily characteri zed as 
right cr wrong, and efforts to do so reflect a fal se sense of sc ientific 
certa inty. To the extent that courts articulate binding legal rules, they are 
making law, and Ia wmaking is neither objective nor mini steri al. 
The point can read ily be seen by reference to legislati ve lawmaking. 
When Congres~j enacts a new statute, the merits of the statute can be 
evaluated in a varie ty of ways . Va ri ous jurisprudential theories offer 
criteria for determining what the law should be , but the statute's fa ilure 
to meet any or all of those criteria does not make it wrong . Indeed, it 
wou ld be surprising if a statute could be characteri zed as wrong based on 
its fa ilure to meet the criteria of a particular legal theory , given the 
frequenc y with which the cri teria of different theories contli ct. Rather, 
legal rules reflect a choice amo ng normati ve principles and policies . A 
lawrnaker may adopt a statute that reflects bad policy in the se nse tha t he 
has chosen undesirable values to further or because his chosen statute 
does a poor joo of furthering those values. As a resu lt, critics may argue 
that a statute :': hould not have been adopted, or that the statute is bad 
policy. The face that the statute ret1ects bad policy , however, does not 
thereby m<1.ke it -- -.v rong." It is simply incoherent to app ly the concept of 
\vrongn e~-;~; Lt_, th ~;-:::: statute. 
The san~e un;_d ysis applies to judic ial lawmaking. Courts incorporate 
valu es. in:_::cprcti">e princ iple s, political considerations and po li cy 
preference::: in1u c:leir decisions. At every s t~1ge. reasenable peopl e, 
incletcl re :.t::.on ;:·t bli~ jurists, ll.1 (ty disagree a.'; to th~: appropriate criteriD to 
be used ii1 lTi\r_·l ;i ng a deci1.:i on. ':{et, the selection of these cri teri <l inore 
clo~;e \y rr: :~ e ' ;n bie::: n choice than the ide ntificatio n of J.n object ive truth. 
l'Vl<)>'e'() '·' r'' ' ·]·,, . . :: c·i "' :' '<l·'tl nf 1I'.,r,c; p ,.,-i t.n•·i:• ··:l'lle-··· t'll''l'I t!V-' 'l'JD -J'ic· :1[i r)n ·"'· '' ...._ \. l , _, ... ) - · I ' - ~ j ...... : ·~' • '~ ~ '"-- ) • '- .1. ~ J \.,_ . . .. ~ ...-A. ~ \ ~ U. ' ! - 1.. • 1 l ( t '-' t- .. 1 - :.. ~ ~ ~ . .... . - \.. ' 1 
the critc:r;a. ol'ten Jerenn..ines the result. A :;ubsequent coun·s di s8.g!·;::en;cnl 
'Vl';-lr-· :; -,-,, . ,, ., -,· 'L')··,-.• -.,c.. u·' . ~ -1-, f ic· ''1('•''t ·l'; l,-,-.lv 1 •0 re-F'i c:·oe'r .. r1J. '-''-lOJ'f'i"J'rlP!'it .,·l·-. l-"l'' •·]-,, 
-' . 1 J. -· _t -' ' : ~'.l 
1 
1·-· · . . ,.... ' ··· • -· . .. 1 !I ;. •l l! .,. \...- !. .1 \. .• ..,.! '- . (t .l ,J '- .::::: _ . ._.. ~ -- L ~ ) I 1. \.t\1..-
f-:'c i· ~~·\ ... : :\~-. ii.i :.. . i g~-~- ~ ;Ylight d i ~·.:~;_g rec CJ'/f.: r \:~,~· h_c ther a stat ute i:-: tO t~e 
irrterprc i.ec: :-;(.~ iei j i:1y· 1\;fen: D!..\: to the t t:\t ur \Vllethr~r it is ~ d~;() ~tpp ro pri~ l t -::: 
ttJ c on:-.;~_d -c t h~~ ; dti\,f: ~ri.:-~. io ry or to 1nc nr-~Jor~tte p<Jlicy coDsider:Jtion:-;. 
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methodology/' as well as the questionable range of application of one 's 
chosen approach,"r' undercut any claim that a given decision is objectively 
correc t in the sense of absolute truth. Moreover, as \V itl-1 the :;tatute. the 
choice of incorrect methodology or the pursuit of undes irable objectives 
does not making the resulting rule incorrec t. 27 
This observation applies with the most force to Supreme Court 
precedent. Few legal issues reach the Supreme Court if their resolution is 
obvious. The presence of a circuit split, a virtual prerequi~:ite to a. grant of 
certiorari, indicates disagreement among federal appellate judges. Even 
when the case is decided, the decision may not command the support of 
all members of the Court. The outcome of the case may reflect a va riety 
of policy, methodological and political choices, but i:) unlikely to 
demonstrate that the minority view is objectively without n1erit. At the 
same time, the decision results in a precedent that, at the time it is 
annou nced, has garnered the support of a majority of the membr:l·s of the 
highest Court in the nation. Can a rule that garnered the support of en 
least five of the nation' s finest jurists persu asively be attacked as \Vrong 'l 
Thus, the wrongness approach is better understood i.ls a cuurt ' s dec ision 
to privilege its view of the right over the view of a predecesso:· cDurt. 
Larry Alexander offers a definition of ''wrongne<;s," for stare deci~.;is 
purposes, that attempts to respond to this concern.'' Alexander explain s: 
\Vhc1: I speak of precedents that are ··incorrect" in lhc eyes or th <~ ,,ubs c:q u·~ nt 
court. I am referring to cases of first impress ion . cases th al were direc tl y governed 
by principles of political morality (or policies derived thcrefrun-·) and in which 
those principles (or policies) were mi sapp lied (in !he view of the subseque nt 
counL 21.) 
25. S!'e. !:' .g., Richard H. Fallon . Jr. , A Cnllslmcril·isi Coiil:: renu Tli c-o: r o{ 
Collstirurionul!nrc rprerution , 100 R".RV. L. REV. 11 S0 (! 9S7) (idc ;;t ifyi ng fiv <~ di!'kl'<·:<: 
types of constitutiunai argu ment that arc widely accepted as kgilim:Hc) . 
2(:, . Sec. e.g .. Michaci .J. Gerhardt, A Tule o{T:•·o Te'.!u:di ·.rs: ,'\ .. ~· riiicu : C. !!I 
n(Ji!Si ice .l Rluck und Scuiiu. 7.:+ B.U. L. REv. :25 . 55-·C1.i i. i'/J-i) ((! ,:_.;;_.,.; :·: '.>\'- .:;~s;i .. _:•.:::: 
Black ~1 nc! Sca! ia. hoth se lf-dcscrihed textuali~;ts, have Ltilcd ~u ~·~dli~~' r \:· to ;_ h,~· ~.: :.i i'! :-~ ti ~ ut ioi ·: ~d 
lu: t \Vhen ::.uch an apj)roach contlic tccl with ' 't h·.:ir pc:·::n; ::_>i ' '""' i~ ';! :ti::~t! ,':: 
regarding tih: ro!e nf the ft::d eral judiciary in .L\ :Pt~riL· i.ln :~ (H.:i~; 1_y--i. 
27. Cf. .Ah ii ;I! l T. Arulanantham, Note : !Jreukin,-,; tin· Pl'ie.• .... : ,, ,,! 
i-(edi.llii _ !07 Y.'\ I.E L. J. i i\53 ( 1993) (sugg ·~::ting \f./ i!i::'<~!1: ·:!.<:i •; ·::: !' ;-,.- ;:·: ,·· : t>> · . ' . ' , ' ... · 
lhcory <; I. ic::;<li co ;-rcc lness ). 
2:\. A. !nandcr. su;mr note Y. at.:'\ . 
. ~i.J. !d. 
Although a subsequent court may wel l vtew principles of political 
morality differently from its predecessor, this disagreement provides 
little basis for choosing the second court 's view over the firs t. '0 It is 
therefore tempting to resort to the wrongness characterization as a 
rhetorical device to undercut the authority of the initial decisionmaker. 
One may argue that the wrongness approach mischaracterizes the stare 
decisis inquiry. Courts, it may be said, do not evaluate whether a decision is 
wrong in an objective sense; rather, they attempt to determine whether 
ovenuling wi ll improve the lmv. If the new rule is normatively superior to 
the old rule, than overruling is justified. This approach might be termed 
the ''badness" approach. By focusing on improvement , this approach is 
consistent with efficiency based theories of legal change, a point that 
will be developed further below. Moreover, the approach explicitly retlects 
the role of courts as lawmakers. Recogniz ing that legal rules retlect a 
variety of choices in an effort to meet a specifi ed objective, the badness 
approach enables courts to replace a rule with a better alternative. 
Although the badness approach offers a theoretical perspective on stare 
decisis, it does not app.::;ar, as a descriptive matter, to reflect exi sting 
doctri ne . Few deci sions expressly characterize the decision to overrule 
as an attempt at legal improvement. The Supreme Court's decision in 
S'tote Oil Co. i' . Kolin. '' is perhaps the bes t example of the badness 
approach. Kohn involved the questi on of what constitutes a restraint of 
trade under Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a 1968 decision, 
Albrecht v. Hemld Co. ,32 the Court had held that vertical max imum price 
fixing was a per se violation of the statute. The Court determined that 
the per se ru le best served the objectives of protecting competi tion and 
consumers.-'' In Kohn. the Court ove rruled A lbrecht and rejected the per 
se rule. 'J Co urt justified overruling on the basis that the per se rule was 
bad policy, explaining that ti11.~ economic reasoning behind its conclusion 
in Alhrecht \vas tla 'vvecl. '' ln other words, the Court concluded that the 
:w. !t is lair to quest ion wh ether the doctrine or stare ue•:isi:; is similarly 
obj,~ctionab! c Cor privileging the first court's view O\'e r the second. Max Stearns make :; 
~'s imilar point in describing stare ckci s1s as cont ri buting to the path depende nt n ~ll Urt: o l' 
jud icia! dcc isionmaking. M~1x we ll L. Stearns. Swnding Bockfi·om ihe Forcsr: JusriciuiJi!irY 
und SoL·iol Cho ice. 3:1 CAL. L. REV. I :109. 13·+9-50 ( 1995). I address thi ~ point bri e fl y in 
partY. 
31. 522U.S:1(1997) 
32 . 390 US . 145 ( 1968). 
34. 522 U.S. at 21. 
_-;:;. -- .-'-.i'tcr n.'con.-.;idcring A!!m:'Cilr' ~ rati \lnale and til e :; uh:;tantial nilicism the Lkci ~ i<lll 
h~:-; n~L'c'iv ed. h0\1\:vn. we conc lude th<tl lhr~n~ is insulliL·iclll economic justification lc1r i'L' l' sc 
111\alid<uionoi· vcnicalmaxim um price fixing ... k:o!uz. 522 U.S. <tt 2 i. 
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[V n l. ! ~-i : 9?.20031 The lmplicMions o/'Tmnsition 1'/ieon 
.JOURNAL OF CO>iTE\I PORARY !...EC;.\L ! SSU:-~S 
economic ObJ ectives that it had identified in Albrecht would be better 
served by elimination of the per se rule. 
Kahn is, however, atypical. The Court ' s initial choice of a legai rule, 
in Albrecht, reflected an explicit policy determination, result ing from the 
Congress's delegation of broad lawmaking authority to the courts under 
the Shennan Act. ln a sense, the Court can be viewed as engaging in a 
type of lawmaking that resembles the legislative process . As such, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Court articulated its justification for legal 
change in terms more commonly applied to congressiom~l actio n. 
Legislative changes in the law are commonly explained as efforts to 
improve the law. Whether the identified objective is efficiency, fairness 
or some mher goaL the claim that a legal change results in n rule that 
better rneets thi s objective is clearly a sufficient just ification for the 
change. Modern transition o.nalys is is premised on the assumption that 
l"'cr " ] 1 ' 1!1~'1]Cre crei1f'l' 0 1lv l·mp·-oves· i)·le )0 1' 1 ~ln "SSlll-,-' l)tl. ,-"1 •Lh:1; cir;v"'c 1\ .. C't..l . ..._ --L ;:::- ;::: ,_, (.1,.1 J __ _.. 1 _ Ll/'1'~ '-- ~~ u. ,_ lof Vt Jl_ _ . 1 -......) 
theori es about the manner in which legal change should occur. Whetlv:r 
OJ. 110' "~1 r l1 rht·s- '·1 SSLJI1lptl.On :, 'lppt-r-•nl·i"t'P fo,- :=-;t'r.le:- ip o-i-,·•· ·,:-;ve '"l. 1.._ t ,J ._ • ..-£ l. ~ u, J l ..__. (. ..__j! . , (l ...... L I;._ ._. 1 ~ I..__ _::;. 1 ,_lll. ... l...t , '..f 
adjudicati ve luwrnaking is an issue I address below. 
None theless. courts have expressly rejected the notion th:.t: improving 
the law is a sufficient justification for overruling. A:; the Suprt':rnc Courr 
has repeatedly stated. "fn most matters it is more inipc,n;; nt th at t h·.~ 
I • t l ; -4-~ J ) l t l l ' · I 1 • ' 1. -. ~ .1i1 app!lc::n e nue 01 t:cnv oe sett eo tnan tnat n oe ::e tLecl ;·1gnt. 
Ac!'OJ·cJ J:Il cr[v tl1e- C')ll!·t's·· CJ1ecisl. Oi1<;; C:ltlll"t b1e· ·, ·p,l,j 'lS ''ll '-110'-;Z;'l'-' ,-.,"L;r•<: t r' ~ ...., • -;:::; J~ ' _. . ,~ _ ~ _ ...__, . . v _ .. ~· --'-· c_,_ .... t L J l -l~ .:..:- '"- '-·' . . l.• _v 
ignore legal rules simply because the rules are bad. Courts rypi ,:ally do 
not conduct an effici ency comparison between the old ~· nd new legal ru le~~­
t·-Jor is it c1eclr that vve \Vou.ld expect thern to do so. l.Jnch:: r the ::: ~< i st in g 
S\,~ , .~Il' ._ , ··· l 'u-s·r · l·-· t ·~·-~1 d it':r··~,·PJ1··"' 'o· " 'L'VPe•-, 1eo-i si >•tive '"lCl :;rii;:,-h·::J.· t; '' "'· .. ..... -""~\..... J~ .... . .:-.!. . _(. l.!. <- - \ _. ! ~ \_.-\,...- ..... v v ·J. . ~ u ..... - ~- .. -....- --· - ·· ·· ·· ··_ i - · _.... J -...'· 1 ' .... 
lawn1aki n ~r is the role of orecedent. Legislator~; face no ~;)· i ste mic cc r:~;tri..l int 
.._ . t-
)-, ' L' l' l ' ' b ' 1 ' ' l on t!,eir enorts at egat Improvem ent ecause tncy <:1 re n;;t oou:1cl Dy t,1e 
decisions of prior legislators." 
The Court h;i >; also ju :~l ified overruling in some circurn::.tancc-;::. in 
\vhich the defect 111 rhe \)fig in a ~ de~:ision is rnore tec hnical in nan.1 re . -~~ 
- ---·--------··-·--- --
36. .!; go:.; li ni \". r-:·elinn . 52 l l.f. S. "2(;_1,_ 23 ~~ ( i997) (quoting Bu~·n(~·l v. C\) J'() J1~tdo C'it 
l~::_ c ~·::..; C>~ .. ~2~--;s ·u.s . :;9~. -+06! 1932} tB r~indei~; . J.. disse t~t ing)J . 
. ·.;7_ .SL\) , .:) )-~ .. C" hc1-y· I fJ. B!ock. P(n/:olo:-!._ics ut the !ffier.'\ec:rion t/t c ~·::· : :· , /(~ cion~! 
Tux Le,~ islurit·e Prr.·ccs:-:es . .:.L; B.C. L. R~ l-:v· . ~-;(; ]_ 92.) i:2001) (s!~Hln~ that .. il i::. \\ \ _:;j .. 
Sr:ttL:d prjn cip lc nr t_·onsl. i tu ti O ~l~d (a\V lh ~lt on :~ C~ ongre~;~~ c:_liHlDi. i:i~·1d ~tn c>rhcr" ; . 
JS . See. e.g .. . A.rn:y L. P~tdck·n. !"Joe ~ . ()Yc rrulin g f)(!cisi;;ns in l f; :,' 
The No!e r ,~ f" u ()(·cisinn 's Vo rr), A;; e. end Sul~jec r :·;/u!lc'!' in !he AJJjJ/i(·ur/tn! Srurc 
f)ecisis ,-\_f/er F'~tync v. --r l~ l"!n c s .<. c!.:: . S1 C~ ro. L . .i . 1 (~ ~)9 ( 199-1-.: (tlc sc ~- i~-) ing ;_l iid ; __ ~- r~. l c i:<~tg 
Such defects inc lude an initial dec ision rendered by a close margin 
(typically a 5-4 majority),-'9 a decision rendered without the benefit of 
full briefing and argument,·10 a dec ision on a procedural rul e,-1 1 a dec ision 
that is o l d,-~~ and, somewhat inconsistently, a decision that is very recent. .j' 
Presumably the Court views the technical defici encies in these cases as a 
proxy for a merit-based analysis. For example, a close dec ision arguabl y 
is less like ly to be correct than one commanding the support of all nine 
J u s tices. -~-~ A very old decision may be out of elate . -~' Abse nt such a view. 
it is diffi cult to understand the rationale for according these dec isions 
diminished precedential value . After alL a close deci sion is no less 
bi nding on the parties before the court than a unan imous one . 
Perhaps recognizing the danger that a pure merits analysis poses for a 
system of precede nt , the Court often requires some compone nt in addition 
to a deficiency on the merits-a type of merits plus me thodo logy . .j(, 
Justi ce Souter argued in Payne, for example, that stare dec isis req uires 
wrongness plus a "special justifi cation" for a decision to be overruled."7 
In Poyne, Justice Souter found the special justification to be sati sfied by 
Rehnqui st- Sc::~ li a approach to stare decisis as giv in g reduced precedcn tial impact to 
dec isions th~tt were rendered by 5-4 vo tes or we re recentl y dec ided). 
39. See id 
-W. See. e.g .. Hohn v. Un ited States, 524 U.S. 236 ( 1998) i,ov:.:rrul ing prim decis iun 
in vo hing a proccc!ural rul e that had been rendered without full briefing ~l iKI argumen t). 
41. See id. 
42. The age of a decision is someti mes cited ~~s a reason ror gi\·ing stare dec is is 
greate r force. See South Carolin a v. Gathers. 490 U.S. at t\24 (''the re~pect aceorckcl pr1 or 
decisio ns inc reases , rat her than cl ccreases, with the ir an tiqu ity . as the socie ty adj ust s 
itse lf to the ir n istence . ancl the surround ing law becomes premi sed up(1n the ir \'a li cli ty .. l. 
None the less . an older dec ision is more like ly to have become .. outdated or i n co n s i ~. tcnt 
with contemporary va lues ... Padden, supru note 38. at Hi94 . 
43. See. e .. g .. South Carol ina v. Gathers. 490 U.S. at 824 ( Sc~1ii'i. J. dis:-cen lingJ 
(ad vocat ing that erroneous decis ion be overrul ed pro mptl y before laws ~ tnci pracices '1 rc 
~1djLNCci to Clllbudy it ) . 
. :f.+. See. e.g .. -+4 Li quormart . Inc. v . Rh ode Is lane!. 5 17 U.S. -.J. Scf. 5\ () ( l ~Jl)(l) 
( .. Because the 5-tO -~f dec ision in Posadas marked such a sharp hrc,d-: from our prior 
preceden t. ... we dec! i ne to give fo rce to its . . . approach ... ): P~:ync v. Tennessee. 50 I 
U .S. 808 . 82t\ - 31l:.! l)9 1) ( ··Booth and Gathers \Ve re ckL· idec! by the llcllTOW<~:-; t •,; i 111,1r:; iw: . 
O\ Cr spirit ed c! i:-:, cnt s ... . [T ]hey were wrongly cl ec icled . . . ~ u1 ci 11Cl\' ' [arcj .;\(Tru1cd ... ). 
4:1. 13ur .1ce South Caroli na v. Gathers. 490 U.S. at S2..; 1Sc:di ~1 . J.. d : \~:t.· n;i:;g) t .. l 
had th~_J u gill that the rc ~ :rl •2 ' .. 't accorclecl prior decisions in cT~ase:;. rat i ·, :..~r lliclll (i<X re:h:: .;. 
with th c: ir anuq ui ty. 'Is the ~:oci e ty adj usts ibcif Lo the i:· ex istence . ::m! tl:•: •:urTuu:<d ing 
law become:; J11"L~mised upon their valiclity.''). 
46. Sec Dcbo1·:d! Hei lman, The ill!portunce o/ r\i!pcwing f~;·inci,J ;icd . "37 .~,i-: 1/ .. L 
REV . l J li S. i 120 11.'1 :) ( Jl)l) .S ) (cicscribi ng debate with in ' Llle cke isis het.\\Cen tho ~:.,~ >.vhu 
be!ic\e :hat \\Tun":·:·:ss alone is suil ic ient to justify ovc:Tulin.~ ~tnd t! !,::·,·: v. iw b.:iic>.:: 
so n1eth i1 1g lTH.-n·c iS req uired ). 
' f t . hlm e. 501 U.S. at 642 (So uter. J.. n>llCL!JTing; . 
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the fact that the precedent was both erroneous and unworkable. ~' Similarly, 
in Dickerson \'. United Sto tes,"9 the Court explici tly stated that although 
it might disagree with the holding in i\llimnda \'. A ri::ono'0 as a matter of 
firs t impression. its di sagreement would not justify overruling M irmzdo 
absent speci al jus ti fication.-' 1 The Cow1 has iden tified a vari ety of factors 
that, combi ned with legal error. justify overruling, including a contlict 
with other precede nts, the presence of an unworkable legal test ch::mged 
circumstances or interve ning developments.-'2 
Under any of its fo rmulations, the merits-based approach to stare 
decisis is problematic. Fi rs t it is difficult under an y of these approaches 
to identi fy an ap propri ate measure of defici ency in the original decision. 
Although most of the Court 's decisions appear to require some minimum 
threshold of legal error o r deficiency in order to justify overruling, it is 
di ffi cu lt to quantify the meri t evaluation in the Court 's an alysis. The 
point can be illustrated by reference to the Court' s recent decisions. 
How does one determine that the magnitude of the Constitutional error 
in Ne w York \'. Uni ted Sta te.'t' is suffici ent to j usti fy overrul ing , but that 
the presumed error in Roe 1'. Wa de5.j is not'? Articul ating the standard in 
these terms de monstrates how eas il y the evaluation deteriorates into the 
type of political debate that does not see m to be part of the calculation. 
Moreove r, the size of the legal error is not a proxy for the magnitude of 
the social harm intli ctecl by adhering to the result ing rule. A court might 
we ll use an in terpre ti ve me thodology viewed as erroneous by a majori ty 
of the Supreme Court to adopt a rule that was des irable from a soc ial 
welfare perspecti ve . 
Eve n if the oici legal rul e were evaluated in term s of obj ec ti ve 
effic iency cons iderati ons- a cost/benefit analysis of the proposed legal 
change-the essent iall y po licy dri ven nature of thi s analys is is \ve il 
removed from the methodo logy that mos t members of the Court purport 
to employ in in te rpre ti ng statutes or the Constitution. Moreover. there is 
little reason to believe that courts are well suited to condu ct this analysis . 
T he litigat ion con text offer:; courts an incompiete record with which to 
': v;.duate the r;roiected be nefits of a leg:al chan2:c and to compare those 
l ~· .._. L-- 1. 
------- ----
- L<) 5 _\ l1 L_;. s ~ 2 ~: ( 2 (j()(} ) 
'iO. ~i)-i. U .S -1:161 1966; 
'i l. 530 US <t l -P :2 . 
52. s·r:e. c . ,~ .. P ~lddc ! L su,n ru nutr.:~ JS . Jt 1604 . 
:i J. 505 Li .S 1 -~-l- ( J<JlJ2) . 
5-k -+ 10 U . S.1 Li ~ l 07 J ) . 
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benefits to existing law. At the same time, the Court's limi ted control over 
its agenda hampers its ability to maximize efficie ncy through legal change. 
Second. a merit-based c.malys is c.lppe<lrs insensitive to the va lues 
inherent in the system of ~;t are deci~;is . A system in which courts have an 
) ,. . 11 ' ' l .• 1 d r ' ' . oJugatJ on to nc1 1ere to prececent nas oeen \Y1c1e1y 1efenc1ect on L~ var1ety 
of grounds ranging from effi cie :Ky to fairness." It i:; suff ici,.=nt, for 
su mo:· ;,:::s of this essa\1,' . to i:lckn ovv \ed2e both that compellin g: ann:rnents ;_ ;_ • ~ .. .._ <.._.. 
bt ve been raised for adhere:-!!:e to precedent and to note that the Court 's 
:;tare decis is doct ri ne continues to reflect ~\ sensitivity to these concerns . 
. L· c'tF '-I' -L· l'lP 'llP'·its ·p]1v ~ li· ' ·Jr;,;: r-h ;1 5 rJ"' .-f'J·ihP d :d)CI\' ·~ ;1p nP'lr.:; •o rPtlPrt -~~ l ~C ... l~ ~~ .o . . ... l .. L , _ _ , ,) '"'f-'f - ~ -t ......, !._. - - __ 1._:) ._ · · · '-'-·._ _ _ .. C.-. --- ,.[""'.....- £. . .. .. . - . ...... . . _. __ 
dlf' .~ ()j"'lDPT j.llG '1''-l'Lle '· J'•l 'J·~p ·r';O>ni · in,, syc:telTl ('-F 11'"P{'."L'·le·l-:t Tn' Ll'' 'l-1' •110LJU.il .... - ~- \__ 1 ..... -~ l J • C · L-t ...... , ~ 1 _, l ._, , 1l 1 ~ ,. Lt . ._,- -.. ~ 1. . ..' .. c 1 -..... ..... ..__ - . . .. "> . ( L . .:::;-. ~ 
·~here rm1y b·~ value to folluwing a precede nt, that value is dimini shed 
;;; n' f:l' tl'lP n:·oredf'Pt J· s '1''\V·~~~- i. -;•'o J'P '.:I·n· J.hJ·l\ 1 l.f,. st' l'"P ,·Jp r·ic;l·,- J.<..: -\ 1;l1't'l.ble { '"""' - -- lJ .!_ \..,., ,._, • -'. I I L l.L ...__ 1\._ • .t '-' . ,._) 1- 1 • ..... .) ' '· (. l ~ \ _, ...... ..... .1 '. ..) .. , - .:. '- ( 
1;·: n~1d hpr;:•·t "P 1't ;-.•. ,~,tP :''·;: J"P]i ;•n!'P inte r·p ~ ·L" c •l·1e d f'"r";S!.("l •·r, nveP'LJ]P i s ' ·' f-'' .. l ... L''-'~ -tl;-,_. . t-J l -... . . ·- ..... l J .,__. _,_ \ ,_,_ "-' .11 ...... .... . ., _ -., ~ L, ._. _,..._.1 - · •· l -...1 I. , ... ! ~· . .. 
less problen;atic v1hen no ';l:b:·;tantial reliance interests are sacrificed by 
0 . __.,. .. 1 .. 1 '11·1.' a 5c. 
·-· / ~L L. ·::::· 
'T'he ~~ rticu1 ~~ltion, in the ·C:Jur( :; opinions. of the benefits of srare decisis, 
ctr:d the interests protected by adherence to precedent, has led some 
commer:tators to characteri ze the doctrine of stare decisis as u balancing 
ces1: nr a cost-benefit ana.Iysis. '" The sense that stare de·: isi s involves a 
;,. .. -l'H1<' ;11G ot' (' qr.,petl.'la V:·' 1ll'D <; !""') ]•1 ITIO"): e r, r jl)'/ be 'e'Cll l·n t 1JiC phlJ"'•lity .._.(.l (..!.~ . ,_,J _ b '-" '- ll i 1,:::. . . l-t V, . ._(~ •- Ll.)--.1 u - l. _. ·- (l. 
opinion in ?funned Poreniiwod v. Cuse1.·. '' The Cosey opinion explicitly 
ex·pbi necl that , in reconsiderin!l its mior holdi ng in Roe 1' . Wode ,'" it vvas 
~ 1 ~ 
;eeking "to test the consistency of overru ling a prior decision with the 
:c!e<d of the rule of law. <m el to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming 
c-,n cl uve rmling a prior case. ""') In economic terms. we might view the 
Ccun ,;:.; seeking to deterrni ne the net social va lue of overruling by 
u; mp<.ir ing the benefits obtc-:ined through the adoption of the ne·w legal 
~-u l e ~vv .i th the C'.JSts i1npcs·:;(j b)' ov:.:lTuling. !J-nl fke L\ n an~t1ysi~·:; that fOC1_tses 
:-,) . See. t: .g ., i\tiaccy~ supru note 3 (describ ing efficiency justi!'icatinn:--: for dvclrinc 
ur ,'·;t are dc\:i:~i~·:) : Fre derick Schtll1Cr. Preccdenr . ?,9 STA(·L L. RE\:'. 57 1. 59 :5 - - 60 ~~ ( i 9 ;~~7 -l 
{idcPLifying !(~u!· just!fi catiuns for stare clc ci ~' i s ir1cludi:1g L:irnc ~; s. p red i c t~\hili ly . in1p:\~\·Tcl 
::ih. Tik Coun u:;ed thi s r:: a::oni1; g in ;\;/nudi \'. /)epi. of Soc. Sen·ic.:'s . 4.)6 U.S. 
(J:)~) t l97g) \vhcn ii uvc rru!ed !\.'/o n roe ,._ Pope. l65 U.S. 167 ( 196 ] ) l her:.~h y cl i n1i n~H i :1g 
•.he irmwnitv of muni cipaliti es unck1· 42 U.S.C. ( 198:1. The Cll!rt expl ained that the 
:m:n i,j p<tiit ics could net rc~t son~tbly cl~1i m th,tt they relied upun i::lilll.liiit y \\ 1l en they 
'> iuLn·.:d ihc Cons ti tu ti on. -l-36 U.S . at 700. 
the C'uun· s :-:tare decisis c!cris! nns) . 
S ~·;. 505 Ll.S. g_1 3 ( 1992L 
5'0. -i 10 U.S.ll .'ifi973). 
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exclusively on an evaluation of the old legal rule , this cost benefit analysis 
offers a mechanism for considering the systemic and case specific values 
of adhering to precedent, including effi ciency of judicial decisionmaking, 
the integrity of the couns, and reliance interests. 
Although this cost-benefit analysis is initiall y appealing, further 
examination reveals substantiai ·weaknesses . The first problem, of course, 
is the premise that the old rule is defective , a stmting point that is 
problematic for the reasons identified above. If the defect is assumed, it 
becomes difficult to justify adhering to the old rule. ~,;Jodern transition 
analysis makes a com.pelling case that the transiLion costs of leg:al chang:e 
~ L ~ 
are overstated. For example, the degree to which people affirmatively rely 
on precedent is question~\bl e.'' 1 At the same time, adhering to precedent 
can create undesirable incent ives. A oart1v may knowingly relv on a shak'11 1 ... ..____ .. J 
precedent in order to prevent the court fro m overruling it. To the extent 
that legal chan ge is desi rable, it may be better to encourage people to 
anti cipate such change in planning their conduc t than to protect reliance 
interests .<'" Thus the manufac turer of a dangerous product should be 
encouraged to anticipate legi slati on barring its sale or deci sions imposing 
liability for damages caused by its use .<'' In addition, reliance is a function 
of reasonable expectations: if courts were not bound by precedent, legal 
actors would not rely heav ily on prior decisions. lndeed, a coun' s decision 
to adhere to a shaky precedent that people expect to be overruled might 
frustrate reasonable expectations more than overrul in g the precedent. 
Responses to these arguments are. of course, possible. Indeed, in the 
next sec tion , i:his essay suggests that modern transi tion analysis has 
overs tated the case for legal change. For the purposes of formulating a 
doctrine of stare decisis, however, increasing the emphasis on the costs 
of legal change does not facilitate the analysi s. If, as many scholars have 
argued, the costs of overruling are non-tri vial, a cost-benefit analysis 
requires the Court to weigh costs and benefits in deciding whether to 
overrule. This endeavor incorporates ~dl of the traditional problems with 
judicial balancing testS61 How does one weigh the adverse impact posed 
by a bad or erroneous deci sion a g~ti lbt the systemi c harm created by too-
6 I. Sec Fi:<h . . ,u;mt nute i I. at i U86. 
6:2. See K:tpl ow. SIIJ!!'U note i) : Lcvmore. su;nu note 8. 
63. See Mu11ell. -U 6 U.S. ctt 7()() (s tati ng th:tt ··:m:ni cip :tlitic ~; :-;imply cuttH't 
at• ~tnge their ;t!lairs' on an assu mpt ion that thc: y can vio late con:-;titutiuna! ri~hts 
indel'initcly .. ). 
6-L S,•e Fr;tnh: H. Lt~;tc rhrook. \V!w: 's ·;( , Sp cciu! Ahr:ur Judr.;1!.1:'. 6 ! U. CoLu. L. 
REv . 77 3. 7g 1 ( l 9LJOJ (cr it! ciz ingj ucki :t! kil:•;;cing tests). 
1U7 
frequent oveJTuling?''' The Court is being asked to weigh competing yet 
incommensurate values-the value of an identified legal improvement 
against the process values sacrificed by overruling. As Justice Scalia has 
observed, the compari son is "like judging whether a particular line is 
longer thsn a part icubr rock is heavy ."('6 Moreover, framing the analysis 
a:; a cosl-benefit analys is implies a level of quantifiability that seems 
unreal istic. The previously identified limitations on the Court's ability to 
judge the efficiency implications of overruling are rendered more 
trou bli ng by the required comparison. Balancing requires the Court to 
do more th<m ident ify an olcl rul e as bad, it mu st determine how 
precisely how bad the rule is. 
A court 's perception of the costs of overruling is likely to be large ly 
independen t oi' case specific factors. Although individual reliance is 
arguably context specific, other justifications for stare decisis-including 
integrity of the judicial system, efficiency of judicial deci sionmaking, 
prevention of wastefu i cycling, and so forth-are of comparable weight 
in al l cases . A,cco i·dingly, the balancing test or cost-benefit analysis 
Jc-trgely reverts to a rneri ts analy:.; is in which the key factor in most cases 
w! li be the evaluation of the old legal rule. 
lJI. STARE D EClS JS AND TR ANSITION THEORY 
The li mi tat ions of existing srare decisi s doctrine result from the fact 
that existing theories of stare decisis fail to incorporate a normati ve 
con<:eption of 1eg<tl change. Stare decisi s doctrine mediates the frequency 
<.md the man ner in vvhich legal change occurs. The dec ision to adhere to 
precede nt might ultimately be viewed as a decision to refrain from legal 
change, either as :u! absolute matter or through the mechani sm of 
;'\'':::Tuli ng. TL.e : ~•-::n: :equences then of stare decisis are threefold. First, some 
le£?1 cll<:mge~.; \V ill i1Ut occur, as where the Court confronts an existi ng: ·--- .._. (._. 
precedent :_; nd dec ides to adhere to it. Second, some legal changes will 
occur through ;J more incremental mechanism. Third , some legal 
changes '.vi ll be made by an alternative lawmaker, ~.;u c h as Co ngress. 
Thus, at one level, adhering to precedent reduces the incidence of legai 
change. r/Io:·eovc: r !he strength of stare decisis doctrine increases the 
st:.;bility of judg"~ ;r,vJe b v;, 2t the cost of responsiveness. A principled 
(L~. .~)ce . e . g . ~ 1"·-Jnt c. su;}ru !J:Jte i ~ :1t l 3 5 ~ (stat ing th at cou n .. n1ust b;:1lancc th t: 
n~>:d Lo c..:o rT t: ! ~· t n t !~-; t;_ t k\:: il pi't:~cccl cnt ag;_l_inst the cl~ln1agc ov~ !Tulin g that prccl~d c nt \vo ulcl 
c ~tt; s·.~ to :.he !eg itin;cit~ Y u! the: parti cular const i tuti onal rul e~ and of the Const itu tion c;s the 
,_:,~ ·,;-., .o( ; i m :.'j.l ( o!' thi··, : :· \) l.ii ;l;· v · ~; !'u nciamcm al va lues. and then dec ide whether to arpi y •;u:-c 
d::: :J:.;i~·:.' ' l. 
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analysis of stare decisis should therefore incorporate a perspective on the 
desirability of legal change. 
The alternative effect of adhering to precedent is to change the manner 
in which legal change occurs. A court that is IimiLecl to incremental 
lawmaking is constrained in the magnitude of the legal changes that it is .__ .__ '- ....... 
empowered to adopt and must defer to another l~1wmaker for more 
substantial changes. Although a full comparative institutional <.m al ys is is 
beyond the scope of this essay, one significant di stinction betwee n 
judicial and legislative lawmaking is the tempora l scope of the legal 
change. The proposition that statutes apply prospectively and judiciul 
decisions app ly retroactively, is a matter of biack letter lc:rvv .''; Because 
stare decisis sets the parameters for the choice between overrul ing and 
an alternative form of legal change, it should therefore incorporate a 
perspective on the appropriate temporal scope of legal change. 
Modern transition theory speaks to both these issues. Con1mentators 
such as Louis Kaplow,('s Michael Graetz''') and Dan Shaviro7" have 
an alyzed transition policy frorn a utilitarian perspective. They maintain. 
in particular, that efficiency analysis counsels against the provision of 
transition relief when the government change~. the law. Transition relief, 
they argue, delays the implementation of othervvise desirab le legal rules . 
1\!Ioreover. transiti on relief produces undesirable effects ~;ucl: as reducing 
the incentive to anticipate socdly benefici al legal changes and. 
perversely. increasing the incentive to engage in ..:ucially unde:-;irable 
behavior. 
An important poi icy implication of this tr~l:r;iti on an L! lysis is that legal 
changes should be app lied retroactively. ~<,iplow , in p~l rticular, has 
argued that in many Cclses ne\V legal t"ltks should be <lppliecl not just to 
future transactions but to conduct that has occurred entirely in the past. 71 
Kaplow's analysis is thu s consistent with the black letter law that 
judicial decisions apply retroactively. althou gh Kaplow wou ld ex tend 
thi s approach beyo nd adjudicative legcd change tu other ureas suc h as 
; ;o. ,J; ··l·· t ; .-,1- ,, 
lVf..=l ,"') d 1\...~ .J. 
-----------·------
Cl7 . See Fi:..;ch . su;n·o IH_ltl' l l. ~tt l U5 7. 
Si't' Kaplnw. sueru nuk i-\. 
See Grad!. su;mr nntc 8. 
Sec Shavi ro. Slli!i"i! ll ll lc g . 
. '>c Kaplc>·.v. \ll f !U! JhllL' :~. 
iJ 
1 ()I' 
-' :.. -~ ':) 
The reasoning of Kaplow and others is based on several foundational 
assumptions that underlie modern transition theory.'' First, Kaplow and 
others assume that the government behaves optimally, in terms of 
maximizing social welfare, \vhen it adopts a legal change.'~ Second, 
Kaplow and others assume that private actors are able to anticipate legal 
change and respond correctly to the potential for legal change through 
various means including modifying their conduct, discounting and 
purchasing insurance.'' 
These assumptions are crucial to the conclusions of modern transition 
theory in several vvays. The assumption of legal improvement drives the 
argument that it is desirable for parties to anticipate legal change and w 
conform their conduct to the expected change even before that change 
has been implemented. If a legal change is welfare reducing, it would 
obviously be preferable for private actors to delay any changes in their 
behavior. More generally, if legal change is not assumed to move in the 
general direction of increasing social welfare, the incentive effects that 
motivate the efficiency analysis are substantially reduced. 
T he rational expect<Hions assumption responds [0 concerns about the 
cost that legal change imposes on private actors. Iv1any scholars have 
defended transition relief as a mechan!sm for protecting reliance interests.7" 
In addition to his argument that compensating reliance is inefficient, 
Kaplow is skeptical of the notion that such reliance exists-or at least 
would exist in a world without transition relief. Instead, Kaplow argues 
that private actors are able to anticipate and address the risk of legal 
change in the same manner that thev ~t clclress other risks. 77 Indeed. to the 
~ J • 
extent that parties have priced the risk of legal change appropriately 
when they enter into a transaction. transition relief may provide them 
with a windfall. 
Beyond its consistency v;ith rhe retroactive application of adjudicative 
legal change. Kaplow's analysis has broader implications for stare 
n. Si'e Louis Kaplow. Tmn.li!iun : A Co!!Cr'iJIII:li FrUJ/1{')\"IJrk. 13 J. COC·lTEI\IP. 
Lic:G ."'-L ISSUES 161. 172-73 12003). Th·~ l\\0 most c:xplicit assumptions will be the 
pnmary l-ocus or this esse~y. ln aclditiun to th·~~.e ~~~;sumptiun :;_ Lhe standard model runher 
assumes that the risk or legal change is exogenous to the government's trt\ilsition rolicy. 
This assumption will h·~ considered bridly in P~1rt V helm\·. 
74. !d. at i 73: Levmure. IIIJ!ro nute S. C\l 1661-62 ( tlrguing that. bectuse legal 
change is generally goocl. it is desirable iu pr<. •illOLC aggressive kg~d change and to 
encourage legal actors tu ~tnticipatc- ~;uch ch~tnge). 
75. Kaplow. SIIJiru note 73. al 172. 
76. Sec, e.g .. Richard J. Pi,:rce. Jr.. Hcn;nciliug ChnTnll und Slltre Decisis. SS 
GECJ. L.J. 2225. 224-!- ( llJCJ7 J idesu·ibing n'ttmc ol- reli,ulce interests Jli"Otectecl by stare 
decisis) 
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deci~;is doctrine. By definition, a precedent only binds a subsequent coun 
-,vhen th m court is prevented from applying the leg<:ll rul e that would be 
app lied in the absence: of that precedent. The assumption-indeed the 
fundament al component of s t c~re dec isis analysis-is that the subsequent 
court has identified a deficiency in the precedent. Stare ckci:;is doctrine 
r jl G n -~· ,, 'l't1 a v P)"!' i .,,, : ,., (j e 1 eJ··r·J·ll ... , ; '1 cr thP <'; '"C' l ''" ,.t..., l 'tL'(~'· 1 'tll '~P .. ·. \lh 1. cl1 t11e \. 1\..~ It, ,_. <. "-'•\ _, -_,, ~ , ..._. .L1.l ..,.....,.._ 1lll;::: ,_ ... .._.. .... 1 1 L.l~l v~(.l - ·-' ~ U.__J 'IV • 
court is justified in overru ling tha t precedent. Jf however. legai changes 
are presumptively welfare increasing, the court ':; conclu sion that the new 
le2:al rul e is better should be sufficient to J·u stify" overrulin2:. The merits 
~ . ~ 
evaiuation essentially resolves the questi on of whether the legal change 
:.;hou ld occ ur, leavi ng stare decisis as aclc.lressecl only to the issue of the 
manner in which the law should change. If, however, the primmy difference 
between overrulin g and other methods of legal change is the scope of 
transition re lief provided (largely as a result of temporal scope of the 
change), then Kaplow's argument against tran siti on relie f means that 
lega l change should be effec ted through judicial overrulin g, in vvhich the 
temooral scope of the chan2:e is as broad a:.; oossible , and transition relief 
1_ ....... ..' l 
is largel y avoided. Indeed, transition theory's conclusions about the manner 
in vvhich legal changes should be made, conclu sions that have been 
applied most extensively to legislative lawmaking, are ac tually more 
consistent with the current view of adjudic ative legal change. 
Kaplow's anal ysis also reveals a more substantial problem with a 
cctse-by-casc approach to transition policy. Jf the govern men t· s approach 
to legal change is case-spec ific , it is likely to undenn ine the des irable 
ince ntive effects that Kaplow identi fi es . Instead, parties will reduce the 
exte nt to \Nhich they anticipate and/or discount for the risk of legal 
change and, instead, invest excessive resources ex post in seeking to 
obtain transiti on relief at the time of the change . Regard less of one 's 
vi ew of the politi cal process, a subject beyond the scope of this essay, 
this inve~. t ment involves primarily rent-seeking. It also raises senous 
di stribu ti onal CCl i1Cern s . 
T hus, transition theory seems to indicate that the Court's current 
approach to legal change is tvvo-thirds correc t. T he Comt has correct ly 
determined that its decisions should be app lied retroact ive ly and that it 
should <.\void nroviciim: transition relief thromzh Drosoective overrulim:. 
J '- .._, J 1 ..__ 
Similarly. the Court ha:; correctl y foc used upon <l meri ts evdumion in 
determining wht::?lher to overrule a precedent: the key issLie in overrul ing 
i:; :_t com)!clriso n betvveen the old and nevv legal rul e :~. Tnmsition theory 
' 1 l ,.-..., - . 1 . ~ . c :-; ugges ts. nov.J'":ver. t;1 <lt t -~e t_ourt s cont inueo consietei·atJon Oi non-
j "".-·,- ~ r1; ~ f lCi" {·) n : ;!_: r· :i ~-:n1,-, c·;--' ~- l T 111e O"L1verq nl Plj! sh!-J'Ll ld nr-- t ;tlj"f-l'JT;nl tn 'J'·I..c'tPet-l , J , ._ _, .. ~, J _,_ • ..,,\-1 .. o..• . 1 • .. . _:: / _~ (. . \._._ 1 , ~ _ _.. . -~ ' I --'·· · '-'·- . . '\.. , . . • - • ~-' .\\... •-..- · •i..J- l ,, 1 1 ! .._._ 
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reliance interests or minimize transition costs by constraining the manner 
in which legal change occurs. In many cases the proffered reliance interests 
will be unworthy of protection, and in most others, the market can 
address transition costs more effectively than lawmakers. Moreover, 
transition theory suggests that , to the extent that the Court's stare decisis 
approach is moving in the direction of an increased willingness to 
overrule. this approach is desirable. 
IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 
The conclusions of transition theory rely heavily on the core assumptions 
of legal improvement and rational expectations. The importance of 
these assumptions is ret1ected in the two examples cited most commonly 
by the transitions literature: liability for the manufacture of dangerous 
products7' and elimination of tax preferences and tax shelters.n 
One obvious question raised is the extent to which these examples are 
representative. Significantly, common to both areas is a robust concept of 
optimal social welfare. When we consider transition policy in the context 
of products liability, our analysis operates from the perspective of being 
able to identify correctly, at least ex post, that a product is unreasonably 
dangerous and should no longer be manufactured. This confidence perhaps 
stems from the role of science in the identification of product dangers 
and from the expectation that legal changes that restrict the production 
of dangerous products result from increased scientific knowledge about 
the dangers posed by those products. The central role of scientific progress 
in the legal change incorporates a degree of objectivity into the claim 
that the legal change is socially beneficial. Similarly, tax policy scholars 
share a set of core views about the structure of the tax system. Many of 
the examples of legal changes in the tax area involve the elimination of 
tax shelters and inefficient tax expenditures, changes that are readily 
defended as welfare improving policy changes."1 
The rational expectations assumption is also convincingly applied to 
torts and tax. Experience with many dangerous products suggests that 
manufacturers are aware of the dangers of their products and, 
accordingly . the risk of increased regulation, well before such regulation is 
7K. Sec. e.g .. Kapl ow. supm noteS , at 598-602. 
7lJ . Sec. e.g .. i( yle D. Logue. !(Tu.rJJIIH'I'\ Con 't Be Fooled, Murh e Cuni;ress ( 'un: 
r\ i'•t!J!ic Ci ni,·e Penpee1i1·e un rhe Tux Tmnsition [)E'f)((ft'. 67 U . CHI. L. RE\. 15 C!7 . 
15m\ ( 211UU) !ex p!ai ni ng wic!e~prcac! support for rctroaeti w t~l\ law changes among U\ 
policv sc:hcJ!ar:.; ). 
:->0. See . t'<J. .. Sh:l\iru. supm note 8. at 93 (citing ··widcspre ~1d conserNJS ~tm ong tax 
po licy thinkers'· th~tl the tax system maxirni1es welfare by elimtnating all or virtuall y ~til 
teL\ preferenucs in order to empl oy the comprehensive tax base!. 
1 1 ! 
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implemented. Indeed, evidence from industri es such as tobacco, 
asbestos and pharmaceuticals makes a compelling case of informati on 
asymmetry-manufacturers seemingly are consistently better info rmed 
about the dangers of their product th an government regulators . ~<~ The 
likelihood of information asy mmetry strengthens Kaplow' s argument for 
retroactive regul ation as a necess ary tool in order to incentivize 
manufacturers correctly and to prevent them from exploiting this 
asymmetry .x2 Tax scholars similarly often characterize private actors as 
at tempting inappropriately to benefit from loopholes or regulatory gaps 
that were unanticipated by the Jegislature. 8:; The taxpayer is viewed as 
entering into the transact ion with full kn owledge that the tax advantage 
was not intended by the legislature and with the expectation that the 
legislature is likely, at some point , to eliminate the loophole. ' 4 Indeed, 
scholars commonly beli eve that well-financed taxpayers and their lawyers 
are able to identify potential loopholes more quickly than regulators, 
making retroacti ve correction again a response to an informational 
asymmetry. 85 
It is difficult to cletenTtine how broadly transition theory' s assumptio ns 
about the manner of lega l change apply beyond these paradigm cases. 
Indeed, it is possible th at these cases reflect the exception rather than the 
rule. Rather than being sys tematically welfare increasing, legal change 
may instead be random , cyclical or arbitrary. Many soph isticated 
accounts of the pol itical process characterize legal chan ges as responses 
8 1. See. e.g .. Lcv morc. supm note 8. at 167 ! (noti ng ··the !ikclihoocl th at tnhacco 
co mpani es hac! an informati ona l ad vanwgc (regard ing scientific and even pol iti cal 
ch anges( and concluding ··that their anti cipati on of icgal change is the refore to l>c 
encou raged"). 
82. See Kapl ow . . l"lipru IWt c 8. at 599-·600 . 
83. See. e.g .. David Wcisbac h. Ten Tmr!Js /\hour Tox Shelters. 55 T~ .. \ L. RF V. 
2 15. 225 (2002) (desc ribing much tax planning as ·'planning around w~1 rt s in th ·~ lavi · 
and arguing that such planni ng is of no soc ial value ). 
8~. See Daniel Shavi ro. Ecunurn ic Suhswncc. Curporwe Tu.r S!Jeiil.'rs Ullil rh e 
Cmnpw; Cose . 88 T.o, x N OTES 221 (Jul y l U. 2000) !descr ibing efforts by t::ts.payc rs tu 
engineer tax she lt ers to take ad va ntage of unintencl eci rcgui<Hory gaps) . 
85. See. e.g .. Ri chard Lavoie. DeJ il![ i_~ ing rhe Gunslingers: Co-opring r!u:' Tw 8ur 
ir;ru Dissuoding Cor;)()rare To.r Slze!ren , 2 1 V.\. T.-\.\ R EV. ~3. 65-67 (200 I } i(k.-;crib ing 
substan ti al di sparity in sophi sti cation htt wl..'en pri vate-sector auorn cy~ who strLI<.: ture ta.\ 
~ hc lt e rs and Internal Revenue Service auditin g agent:-;r Pe ter C. Cmel io:;. , i TI L\ 
Prucririoner"s Perspecrii'C on SuiJ.1rwzce. Fonrz wzd Busin ess hlljiUSI:' in S!! ·u,-ru rin:-; 
Business Trun1oC1ions und in Tu.r S!drer.l. 5~ SiVl U L. R FV. 47. 5! (200 1 \(s lati ng that 
··experienced tax pru l'e s~ i on als can usuall y reldi ly di stingu ish ta\ shelters l"m m red 
tr ~msacti o n s" · ). 
1 ; 'l 
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to factors such as political shifts or interest group pressure. These accounts 
offer little reason to believe that the resulting legal change will be 
welfare increasing. Indeed, public choice scholarship is premised on the 
potential for interest group rent-seeking to result in the adoption of 
welfare-reducing reg ul atory ch;.mges . 
Additionally, th e ability of private actors to anticipate and price the 
risk of legal change outside of torts and tax may be overstated. The 
market offe rs a variety of mechanisms to enable pri vate actors to 
anticipate and price legal risk. One of the most common is discounting. 
In the stock market, for example, investors demand a hi gher re turn to 
compensate them for the risk of management self-dealing and asymmetric 
information. In order to obtain that higher return, investors discount or 
reduce the price they are willing to pay for securities . As Stephen Choi 
and Kon Si k Kim explai n: "Faced with the prospect of losing money due 
to either lack of information or managerial opportunism, investors may 
adjust their behavior. In particul ar, securiti es investors may choose to 
either exit the capital m8rkets , decreas ing liquidity, or demand a di scount 
as compensation for the risks they face. "~6 Moreover, because in vestors 
recognize that they are unable to identify and price ri sks perfectl y, the 
presence of increased ri sk in the markets leads to inefficient discounting 
and a deadwe ight soc ial loss. Eve n where in ves tors are able to di sco unt 
appropri ately, the identi fi cation and pricing of firm spec ific ri sk is 
extremely cos tl y. ::mel investor inves tigati on costs are soc ially wastefu l. 
As a resul t, a variety of capital marke t regulati ons are des igned to reduce 
investor ris k, which wil l in turn reduce inefficient discounti ng ancl 
improve capi ta l form~lt!o n and liqui dity. 
The nature of the paradigm examples used in transition analys is also 
minimi zes the dist ri butional concerns im pi icated by the inabil ity of 
orivate actor:1 fullv to ant icioate les:al chans:.re. Because tax law often re lies, 
! ~· .! .._ '-
in order to m~1ximi z.e government revenue, on people , s inability to mod ify 
their behavio r in response to legal changes, uncleran tic ipation is not 
viewed as highly problematic. Indeed, some tax scholars offer the prospect 
of a surpri se confi sc~1.tory tax as a theoretical ideaL from ~~ tax revenue 
perspect ive- the surpri se element of the tax enables regul ators to 
generate the maxinwm po~~ sible revenue from 1ts imposition." Simi larly 
the strong rnor(d con1pt;nent behinci regu lation Df d~u\ge rous prcJucts 
unctern1ines the. reli ~u1cc cl:;in1s of n~anufacturers in tort 1avv·. T he a~t~ration 
rights bet\vee n pri \l~.tte 
86. Stephen .J. Chni s~ I<on Sik K in1. E~stublishin,!~ u tVr.: tt· Srock !\~!orkc: j(Jr 
Shore/wider \fo/uc O;·icnicd Fir111s in /<..'or!'u . 3 Cit !. J. l":·rt. L. 277 . 2~(1 (.:!Oil~ 1. 
8 7. See L( ;gu ,~. 111/)m note 7'0. at I 5 \6- 1 7 I c! csc ri bin g argument tlwt -;uqm sc ta;-; 
ma.ximi z~:; ctliL·: ,: ncy hy rcducin::c anti c ipatory di~Lu rt ion ,~ in l ~ t\ p aycr hch;:v inr l. 
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actors, has substantial distributional consequences. Even if, as Coase 
suggests, private actors can bargain around legal rules to achieve 
effici ent outcomes.'~ a shift in the legal rules wi ll nonetheless benefit one 
party at the expense of the other.'" If the risk of legal change is 
inadequatel y anticipated, thi s benefit may be an unbargained-for 
windfall. 
In particular, it may be difficult even to determine vvhether the parties 
contemplated the risk of legal change and how they intended to allocate 
that tisk. Although the contracting process allows private actors to allocate 
and price all risk through consensual bargaining, in practice, limi tations 
on the contracting process frequently result in ambiguity about the nature 
of the bargain. Th is leaves courts with the substan ti al difficulty of 
determining the terms of the contract after the fact, typically through a 
hypothetical effort to ascertain what the parties would have agreed to. 
had they considered the question. The limited <Jbility of contract lcnv to 
address these issues has led to the devel oo ment of a varietv of 
l -
unpredictable doctrines that lead to conseq uences that the parties clearly 
did not anticipate."' ' 
Expanding on this observation, eve n if we assume that private actors 
anticipate and price legal risks appropriately, the Kaplow model does not 
consider the potential costs associated with requiring private parties to 
investigate and price these ri sks. These investigation cost;, in many cases, 
will not be soc ialiy prod uct ive. and may be substant ial. As we rnove away 
from torts and tax, there is less Jnd less reason to believe that private 
actors are well positioned to det:erminc the ri sk of legal change . ln 
aclcliti on. as Coasc observed. the abil ity of parties to reach efficient 
bargains jc; affected by the magnitude of the t rans~1ction costs. '!' Req uiring 
parti es to bargain over the ri sk of legal change increases the cost of the 
bargain, decrea~;ing the like lihood that the tr~msaction will occur. 
At the same time. private actors respond to risk by reducing tl1e extent 
to which they rely on a p<-trticular regulatory policy. If people expect the 
government to eliminate the tax exe rnption for municipal bond int~resL 
they will respond in two wJ.ys. :~·ir:;t people will clemancl a higher return 
__________________ " __ _ " _______ " __________ _ 
:;::c Ronald Cuasc. Till' Pml!l1'1n Sociu! Cosr. 3 J" ;_" & ECC)i'L I ( i 960 ;" 
8'!" Haro!c! Dcmset;:. iV!'oi!!J Disrrihurion ond rhc 01 \"I!Crsh iJI oj"Rig!Jrl. i .L LEG""\ L 
STLD" 223 ( !072) " 
em See gcnemllr Victm Gold ocrg. 'J/;c Entou·c;neur n( Coiilii/CIS ({1/(/ Prim/(' 
Ordering (John !vL Ol in working paper ser ies 2003) (desnibing juclici~t\ e lf<1J"ts In 
r'::con~:ln!cl the: terms ul· hypothdJc:tl hargai n:; due tn L·ontractual gaps)" 
l) I. Ser c·oasc. SI!Jll"l.! not[: XX. (J[ ! j. 
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on municipal bonds relative to other investments. This demand is a form 
of discounting the expected return from an investment in municipal 
bonds to retlect the increased risk of regulatory change. Second. as the 
return on municipal bonds moves closer to the return on other investments, 
some peop le will shift their investment decision away from municipal 
bonds into an investment alternative. As a result. people's reliance on 
existing tax treatment will be reduced. 
The example demonstrates that a transition policy that requires people 
to anticipate the risk of legal change may impose a countervailing cost of 
reducing people's reliance on the existing regulatory structure. This 
effect may not be desirable. There are any number of reasons why the 
government may want private actors to rely on existing legal rules rather 
than antici pating a change in those rules. 9c Even within the area of tax 
law, many tax policies are adopted with the explicit intention of creating 
incentives for people to adjust their behavior.'J' For example, the government 
may create a tax deduction in an effort to encourage investment in low 
income housing. If people are uncenain about whether the government will 
retain the deduction or repeal it, they will invest less than they would 
otherwise. because the risk of regulatory change reduces the expected 
return on the investment. As a result in order to obtain the desired investment 
level, the government will be forced to compensate investors for the risk 
of repeal by increasing the tax incentive. Thus, requiring people to anticipate 
the risk of legal change increases the cost to the government of achieving its 
policy objectives. i\ lternati vely, if the government could credibly 
commit to a specific tax treatment, discounting wouicl be reduced and 
the government would face a lower cost in implementing its policies. 
The exarnple ilhNrates that limiting transition relief imposes a cost 
i'!l'•tt ; ". jlQ'L. rpi·lprte'J1 1.'1 •Lhe "Xl.Stl''iG ll10't'·,Js~-t 1I' ~: ('0St or·· ··erille].PG (joP ~ L l .._ ) • ~ - "1~"-·~ I. I ' -' \_.... L - •-::::: l \...\_,1,_ .._ lL ~ ··- ! ___._ _\,... -1;:::: • •"-' 
governn·;c nr'c.._ ;~bi l ity to cornmit to a particular regulatory policy.':J The 
value of cornmitment is recognized outside the transitions area. and 
C!1lPnciJl'' th e 'lb·ilit\1 l O eoPlrnir i cc WiclPlv l'i '' '·V''' i 'JS inCrP'>c;incr l'"'f · ~ r"!,-·i·l] _, '- ~ • • ::: , _ _ ..,.._ l ~-'- j ' · •..- • .i J.i.>-~ l,_J ~ -'-'L .} ' "'-' ' ..._,...._ i.. , , . ..-C'.. • , c _t\.__ , ) • • . ~·i..-
welfme. tract theory, for example i:; pre•ni:-; ecl on the idea that, in most 
\vhich the parties have con1p1ete 
[: . L . ' gLi t '. To_r 'Trunsirions. . t f/1.:/ :nc 
( __:( Jl ·c· r .:,; ·onun i !nl :: n! . 9 -~ rd !CH. L. RE\'. l 129 ( 19')6) ( idc~Hifying l. h '~ \';.d ue ur 
~U\\.'C!l i 11 t> -l'. ~-~ () ( l! n-liUt1\~J11 in order to induce- private pany l"t~ ii~·tnc (~ c)n lt~ g a! ruk·:..;). 
argues th;Jt .~ tn c ;·nl l l ~_·nt prc-cn ntrnitillCl"tt i:'l a!:-;u Vlt luablc \\·ith rc.-;pccl t c) i :.:. .-;u c~ ! 1~ 
·whi ch lh~~~ g\ _) V:2l·~·ll fi t:?l1t i~; li to tu:·L upponur: l stic~llly. id. Jl 11--t-\.--.17. 
l' I !-;-_ 
l 1 (-,. 
8.~ ['.-'{in~. : nt I\l ~tkai~ ~ltn. -ru_\· Tronsirions un{ ! the l )rut1 {· r.r un 
ssu:·s Cruet::. ttlli.ll<:uploil·. 7) '/ .\. L. Rr-: \ ·. 1 ! 5 =~- ll c-<.:-- t-: =~ ( 1 ~) ~;~ 9 ) 
id l:nll n ~~ l-~llicit_'J l; _- \ ' 
nil ~~-:-~). 
n:~ ~_ :\- ~ !_ilJ. hi(' 
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freedom of contract, including the ability to make irrevocable 
commitments."9; As Andrew Guzman observes, in the international arena, 
states, as well as private pm1ies are generally better off if they are able to 
make irrevocable commitments. ''(' 
The issues raised in thi s section cannot fully be addressed in the conrt: xt 
of this essay. Nonetheless, they suggest that the motivating assumptions 
of transition theory require some additional analysis. Transition relief 
may indeed be inappropriate in contexts in which legal changes are 
clearly welfare improving and can easily be antici pated. In particular, 
tax and torts may be examples of contexts in which the assumption :.; 
generally hold true. As Kaplow himself has recently acknowledged, the 
appropriate transition policy may be context spec ific, depending in part 
on the extent to which these assumptions hold. 9i 
At the same time, the discussion suggests that analysis of these same 
issues should inform the debate over stare deci sis. An investigation of the 
assumptions motivating transition theory demonstrates that appropriate 
transition policy is a function of the nature of legal change. As Jonathan 
Macey observes, the doctrine of stare decisi s mediates "the primordi al 
tension ... between change and stability."":; Consequently , stare decisis 
must incorporate positive principles about the manner in which judges 
make law and normative principles about the extent to which judicial 
lawmaking is desirable. 
95. Andrew T. Guzm~lll. A Cotnp!iwlce -Bosnl Th eo n· ojln!enwrionu! Cc;d ·. lJU 
CAL. L. R EV . 1823, 1845 (2002). 
96. !d. The govern ment ' s abi lit y to CO illl11it to a particular reg uiatmy policy is . ur 
course. limited. One legislature may no t bind its sucr:t:ssor. A., a •:OlN:CJUcncc. legai rul<::s 
implemented by sta tute can readily be ove rturned. Greater commitment !O regubto ry 
policies can be achie ved by imple menting legal rules in the Con sti!dtinn rat!x:r lh::m 
ord in ary legis lati on. becau se o!· the more sig nil"icant r<~s tr!cti(ms impo:;eci by :he 
amendment process. Govemmcnt contracting oilers the gcvem:r:c:nt <tn ~tl t u-na ! i\· ·-' 
commitment device . Sec. !:' .g .. Un ited States v. 'i,A/ in~.t a r Corp .. 5 i~-~ U.S. :<'·0 t i'-;')\>i . 
A i though doctrinal constraints on the en forccmcn t o r government cotili·a '-·t ~; \\·t:ai·:c:r• th i:; 
const rain t, the Supreme Coun has limited these cons traint:;. ;-c,:ogniziil g the impun:.tr:<.'•.: cJ 
the government"s ~tbility to make credible commitme nt:;. Sec V/illi~t:n Kt;v:_t:.:i c. 
Legi.1/wors Accountuhle )i)/· !heir f<egululoJT Prml!iscs. 200() L. Rt'V . 1\'l.S. U .-D.C.L. c; 
(2000). Si milarl y. the governmL~ nt cetn incre ase~ its <.'o mm itmcm w !ega! ru!c:; by ;•c!hcr: n~ 
to a strong doctrine of st~1re dcc i~is. The r;_tng e u! ~ L.l \Vll~! D.king toni :-:. ~.~:~r~:r:-; lhc 2:!0\ .. ~~; T!!l .... :'. 
the abili ty to differen tiate in terms of its cotmn itm•::n t kvel. 
97. Kapiow. Sllf!ID note 7 3. at 19 1. 
lJS . ;viaccy. Sllfll'il tlllle .\ at !06. 
V. THE CONTRIBUTION OF STARE D ECISI S FOR TRANSITION 
T HEORY' S ASS Ul'vlPTIONS 
In Part III we saw that the appli cation of transition theory leads to the 
conclusion that the traditional doc trine of stare decisis places excessive 
value on fidelity to precedent. By limiting the ability of courts to adopt 
be tter rul es by overruling inferior rules, stare dec isis constrains desirabl e 
legal change. Moreover, to the extent that stare decisis modi f ies the 
manner of legal change by forcing cou11s into incremental decisionmaking 
or requiring an a lternative lawmaker, it substitutes transition relief for 
the full retroactivity of adjudicative lawmaking. 
What explains stare decisis then? Given the efficiency implications of 
transition analysis, why don· t couns oveJTule more frequently? Indeed, 
cou11s appear oddly reluctant to overrule. The continued search for special 
justifications in particular demonstrates a di scomfort with overmling based 
simply on the defectiveness of the initial decision. ln addition, the com1s ' 
continued respect for the role of precedent extends beyond the borders of 
stare decisis doctrine. Decisions such as U.S. Boncorp v. Bonner Moll 
Portnership99 and Anastusc<ff v. Un ited Stotes1no signal an unwillingness to 
Permit courts to use alternative mechanisms to manioulate the bindin£ effect I ~ 
of a precedent, such as vacating a dec ision or refusing to publish it. 1111 
One possible explanation for the persi stence of stare decisis doctrine is 
the courts' belief that the driving assumptions of transitio n theory appl y 
narrowly. Courts may be reluctant to overrule precisely because the 
consequence of overruling i ~; tha t the Court's legal change will be ap plied 
w ith full retroactivity and without transiti on relief lf courts do not view 
legal change as systematicall y we lfare increas ing and pred ictable, they 
may consider transition reli ef appropriate . App li cation of stare deci sis 
rec1uires courts to make inc ren1ental lt'£al changes rather than overruling, 
~ ~ ~ 
affording private actors a measure of trans itio n relief. Broader le gal 
~ ~ 
changes are implemented through legisla tion and constituti onal ame ndment 
rather than overruling- procedures in wh ich transition relief is the norm. 
In other words , the courts· stare decisis policy may not be a mis take that 
99 . U.S. Bancnrp i\1l ort. Co . \. Bon ner Mcd l Partnershi p. 513 U.S. lX ( 1994 ). 
100. 22:1 F.3d 898 . 899 (8t h Cir. 2000) . \clClted as mooL 235 F.3d 1054 tS th C ir. 
2001)) (en h<mc ). 
10 1. Similarl y. the Coun·s ellort to limi t •he preccdcnt ial val ue o f its deci sion in Bush 
v. Gore. 53 1 U .S. 98, I 09 (2000 ). to the ct;;c at bar has generated widespread 'lCKk~ mic 
critique. Set:. e.g .. Samuel fssacharull. POLI IIC\L jLJDC i'd ENTS. IN TH E VOTE: Bt.:SH. Gm:. E 
.-\ND THE SL'PREI\IE COU RT 70 (Cas-; R. SunstL·i11 & Ric ha1ci A Epstein eels .. 200 I J (stating 
that "the li miting instructi on is either ilh'Jilingk~s or re v•2al s the: new equal protec tion as <I 
cynicd vcs~e l used to engage 111 result-o1·i cntcd .1udgiilg by decree .. ). 
l i 8 
Th e Jmp!icmions of Tml!sition Th eo.r·y 
.ro :_:t-~i".-\L U t: CG>;TF. :vi POR.-\R Y LECi,.; L !SS I_: c s 
fail s to capture the full value of re tro~tct : v Jty for juclici<tl lawmaki ng. 
R , · , 1 ··1 ' · , . · 1 r · ·· · · ,atner, It may oe a celloerate cncnce to 11m1t Ue scope o ·~ J Ud lCJal 
rulemaking prec i:;el y becau se of the li rnitcci abi lity of court::; to prm·ide 
tran ~; iti on relief. 
One response to this argument is that i1 pr("l \ es too much . Stare deci sis 
supplies the mos t minimal COlbtrain t on iudi cial 1 aw imlkin~. Cou rts 
• J '-
have extensive lawmaking powers irrespective of thei r power to ovenule 
precedent. and the transition costs of adju c\ic c1l i·: ; ~ leg ;:d change app ly to 
judicial lawmaking outside the context o f" <In overruling. If transit ion 
relief is warranted. why does new judge-made law apply ret roactivel y? 
One possi ble ansvver is that courts are poorly positioned to determi ne 
the appropri ate scope of trans ition rei ief. Courr·, n1ay not have full 
information on the costs associated wi th !::gal ch;_mge because of the 
ll.nlJ."L ~ltJ.Oll" 01" tJIC- j.lld !.C J. ~l] "'l'O('e··c 1"' 1~ '1if'O"Qo-i e o;; CJ _l., r,•· J· V :1t P ·v·tol··s· u;ho - - ~ ::-, - - -- ~ lJ .... ,J,) . '--' (_·- -- .:::- l . ., . _ l - .1. ...._.._ '-' ~- ~~ ... ' \1) -·· 
'!I'P •:Jft'PC 'Lp r] i·1y the ]P cr;•1 t']1 '-'l'UP "1l o'\! .,,.r 1•f· "1';-" .: "'• n f hc---'1-c··· co. 1· lv -• , .,~, ~, -, · t ( ~ - "'-' '- ·~ . ...- ..... \.... t , . ....., ~· c ·J- ~ _ t_ _ _ , t; ._, 1 - ~ J •'- ~' '" L~- -- i.J .. .._ ,_n _., _ _ ._, \_. -~1l \._., ~,.t .. . ""' ..... .... --• _ . 
Tl1e court rnay tack. inforn1a tlon on the t:)<.te nt to \vhich IJrivate i.-lc t t; rs 
have been able to ant icipate rhe ch ( ~ r~ge ~\ ~:d t (J :.1l1oca1:e the risk\ 
ttssoc iated \Vith it. The r~tnge of nli tigtltion !.':n~~ ~~ v ai1 ab le to th_e cou rt 
rnay not enable the court to taiic>r transitjcJn :~· ~-~ 1ief apr;ropriate !y. Thu~~ ~ 
e\len \Vhere ~l legal change is co~ tly ~ . iud l ci:~dl.Y irnplenv:: nted t ran ~~i t i o n 
n:lief may not be an optima l sol u= ic,n. 
t., lt· Pl4n ·-~ '· i \'f' ly 1t iJJ ::'I V ht=> i! l rln ~v--rz~';rl·• te fz) r CO l.l rt:~ ~ i.J <:~·: t rc i ~:.: e disc retir_,n 1 4 ·~'....- .l .L~l . ,..... • , •- · .• ,: - ..._. . . . J' t ' -' t- --Lt .. ..J """ 
()\/er transition 1elief l:ecau s ~ gre;_tter · s<: n.:.t"icn c:f f(J i· ct::.~ the co ~11·t the 
abili ty 1.0 e.ng_age jn grt:ater :l c \ i v i ~:.ilL ·r ll e requirernent th~l1" judici al 
1a\vn:akit1g operate rei rO<:tct~'-. : ~ l )' pre v~: ~-~ t : ~. cou l·t \ ~ :-ro rn adop ting \ O l ~! e 
leg~al ru les that they rn1 ght u t i: ~.~- r \\/i:-;~: :.1dDpt. "Th L<·< on!.: n1a_y rt: aSD(t C i~J ly 
Court had not been ctb! e io limi t 
The poss ibi lity that ju~licidi discretion over d~c. use: :::Y transition r:::1ief 
vvi]l affect jud icial l a\.V n.1 ~t kir~ g ;~ uggt-::>:t :· ~ ~u: int ~)Grtac~ ~tdc1 i t1cr!a 1 d irr:~ nsion 
to IXL'. n~; i tiun theory. 'T'r:-:ln:-:i~i ~;n ~ ; -J{_~ :)_ry l\ ; L<·~ L~r: ~~~-: th ~n -r ~1 e L ; 
r.:; f 1cg;_d c l;;~:ngc !S inclep!~·~ : -l·~ie·n ~: ~; f th:: i J ; ;_: ~·;;L::· 
i_rlc1u.d1;1g th~.· k?\J \'(~ rn n1::: ~· Ir ~ . : ~ - ·l l · :-- i· i -~:1~ ~ -- ~-:!~~ - - /-~_,_ , 
,' \ Pu . ·; )(j_:·e:i /.:.: c :-,·'-' ,: :· r~ · h s~ ' r; · i < ·.: --
(i{icnj ng- );~ _,; ( itu t iO ll~d lint .\ L_l~;,_: ;~:· ' .. ' i! :h~.~- C' =. ~ 1.1:"l:< ' ~ibill ~. y tn 
l o:".. St_'_' F i ~.; ~.:h . SU/ )i"l/ ;·;=:!k' ~ 1. ; _ !~ \ ( ):~ l) ·>~· :\(; ; ~ l :; ~ i: · l g that p :·n~r~e:cti vc ~lcl_j ud i!:~ t t~ 1. ) ~ J 
~.:na h i ,::d t h!~ ·:):' :t rr•.:n ~ _.- ( ) U r i. ;_n rc, ~· n _:; : : i/· ~ ': \~ -,_ ... ,- L~!.-: i1 :<!t!. :ti O :!:Jl '.:Ti ! ~!i n :.-!1 n!"nc ·~cll ~ ~·c r12:h ~.--: 
. 10 
have identified the possibility that transition relief wi ll cause government 
actors to internalize the costs of legal change, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of legal change, the analysis bas not fu lly explored the 
relationship between transition policy and the lawmaking process . 
What if legal change is endogenous to the choice of tran sition pol icy? 
It is poss ible, indeed likely, that the government's transition policy will 
affec t the ex tent to which pri vate actors seek to in fl uence the lawmaking 
process. rn particular, if the government adopts a policy of providing no 
transition relief, once people identi fy the ri sk of legal change, it may be 
rational for them to invest resources to oppose the change rather than 
adjusting their behavior to reflect the anticipated change . Private actors 
who have predicted legal change accuratel y may be able to block the 
proposed change. 104 The sce nari o is particularly problematic under the 
assumption that legal change is welfare improving. Under that assumption , 
efforts to block the change would be wasteful rent-seeking, and the 
potential consequence of that rent-seeking would be the prevention of 
socially valuable legal change.' '" Under thi s vievv of the world , transition 
relief need not be justified in terms of the transition costs borne by the 
losers; instead, it may offe r a mechanism for red istributing the gai ns 
from the legal change in order to temper the losers' resistance to the 
change and to permit ir to proceed. i"" 
The doctrine of stare decisis mediates between stabi I ity and responsiveness, 
but criticisms of stare decisis based on the argument that it undesirably 
prevents legal change are misguided. Stare decisis does not prevent legal 
change, it merely reshapes the process by wh ich that change occurs. By 
taking legal change as a given, transit ion theory makes a similar error. 
Although transiti on theory focuses on the process by 'vvhich change 
occ1..~:·s. it cannot overlook the broader effects of that proces~; . 
This es say has not atternpted a comprehensive an alys is ot" the 
assumptions underlying transition theory. Instead , the essay suggests that 
further investigation of these assumptions and the contexts in \vhich they 
apply is critical for both transition theory atld stare decisis. ln panict.:br. 
the existing debate over stare decisis may be clarified by expioration (_:f 
·-------------·-----·----
I 0-f. Sec I:'. g .. Lei!' \Vc;1ar. File Concepr of Pmpi:'rl\ wu! rile l£1kings Clutt sc . 97 
COLL'\ l. L Rr:v . !923 . 1936- 37 ( 1997) (describi ng :mlCt:ss by \vhich :;om,_: group ~; lohhy 
to obta: n a lega l change !"ro m '.l'hich they !xncfiL \\'hilc other gmu ps k1bh y lil rt·,~~ ·· :n: t h ·~ 
change as leading to a deadwe ight soc i<li k1ss 1. 
I 05. Sec. e.g . . iVli chac l Ahra111ow iu. Murkc!-iJu.led . Ul!!iililfrufi l·c Cnfo;n'll! i' !ll. :5 
Y ALE J. n~ REG . 197. 25-!--:55 ( 199~) (<tdiOGILing that gu\C!"I1111t:'l1l u:<: e~dmi ni s ttati\•:ly 
determined payment> tu co mpcns,lre losers in un.k t· to Ltl' Ilit:.t tc ad uptil1!l o i· gc::<,:T dl y 
•.:lliL·ient lega l changes). 
I 06. Such cl di s\ ri but ion 11 ould lk an ,dugl>US t ~ ·, thcti neccss,try to m u 1 ,; i'n >ili K<il<.!t li' 
Hick s eiTiciency to PJr•c'tu effi ciency . 
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the issues identified in this essay. Several conclusions are possible. One 
possibility, based on the insights of transition theory, is that the doctrine of 
stare decisis should be abandoned. A second possibility is that courts and 
legislatures are~and should continue to be~different. 111 7 Adherence to 
precedent. retroactive legal change, and other differences may produce 
valuable differentiation in the lawmaking process. A third possibility is 
that couns and legislatures are linked, and changes to the operations of 
one insritution must be carefully considered to prevent unintended 
responses elsewhere. 
Vl. CONCLUSION 
Existing theories of stare decisis rely on a merit-based analysis in 
which the primary consideration is an evaluation of the old legal rule. 
Such an <1pproach seems defensible, in efficiency terms, on the theory 
that social Vv'elfare is improved when inferior legal rules are replaced. 
Moreover. modern transition theory maintains that legal changes should 
be immediately and broadly implemented , without the use of transition 
relief such as grancifathering, delayed effective dates or compensation. 
These principles are consistent with existing judicial treatment of kgal 
transitions, including the fact that judicially adopted legal changes are 
applied retroactively. 
Both stare decisis and transition analysis are based on essential 
assumptions :_;_bout the nature and manner of legal change. This essay 
quesrions the val idity of these assumptions. The essay argues that. at least 
in sorne ,_-<tse:-:, legal change should not be presumed to be erficient or 
predicuble. At Lhe same time, although anticipation of legal change may 
reduce transition costs, it may also lead to inefficient discounting or cause 
parties to avoid desirable transactions. 
The persistence of the doctrine of stare decisis offers a reason to 
question the assumptions that motivate modern transition theory. Indeed, 
the continuecl i.mponance of reliance interests in courts' assessments about 
the dccisiun to overrule suggests that judicial experience with legal change 
may differ frum theory" s predictions_ Courts may be continuing to focus 
! il7. \ '/,: mcty_ for example. believe tint adjudicative change is responsive lu dillcrcnt 
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